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FOREWORD
Since the late Soviet era, the presence of Iran has
loomed large in the minds of the Russian elite. Their vision of Iran has been incorporated in the general view of
the Russian relationship with the Muslim world. Soon
after the end of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR)—and even before—increasing numbers of Russian intellectuals became disenchanted with the West,
especially the United States, and looked for alternative
geopolitical alliances. The Muslim world, with Iran at
the center, became one of the possible alternatives.
Iran became especially important in the geopolitical
construction of Eurasianists or neo-Eurasianists who
believed that Russia’s alliance with Iran is essential for
Russia’s rise to power. Yet, by the middle of Russian
President Vladimir Putin’s tenure, increasing tension
with the Muslim community and the rise of Russian
nationalism had led to more complicated views of the
Russian elite on Iran. At present, the Russian elite does
not mind using Iran as a bargaining chip in its dealings
with the West, especially the United States, and as a
market for Russian weapons and other goods and
services. However, the dream of a Russian-Iran axis is
apparently abandoned for good.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The evolution of the Russian elite’s view of Iran is
traced over the past 20 years of post-Soviet history. The
major thesis and outcome are as follows.
1. During most of the late Soviet and post-Soviet
period, two major trends in the approach to Iran have
dominated the Russian elite. The first emphasizes the
strategic importance of Russia’s rapprochement with
Iran and is mostly supported by Russian Imperial Nationalists, notably those defined as “Eurasianists.” For
these groups, an Iran-Russia rapprochement would
not be a temporary use of Iran as a bargaining chip in
dealing with the West, but a permanent alliance.
The second group believes that Russia should use
Iran as a bargaining chip in dealing with the United
States and as a useful trade partner, but not a permanent ally. Supporters of this view usually see Russia either as a self-contained country or as close to the West,
mostly Europe.
2. Eurasianism and similar brands of Russian nationalism became popular starting in the early Soviet
era, reaching a peak by the beginning of the Vladimir
Putin era. By then, elements of Eurasianism had been
integrated into the ideology of the upper echelon of
the elite, including Putin. Thoughts about a possible,
at least loose, strategic alliance with Iran were also becoming popular. Yet soon after the beginning of Putin’s tenure, an opposite trend started to develop, and
skepticism toward Iran and its relationship with Russia grew. This trend has dominated the Russian elite’s
approach to Iran to the present, regardless of the vacillation in Russian foreign policy. One might assume
this would dominate the elite’s view at least for the
near future.
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3. The changes in the Russian elite’s approach to
Iran—from the assumption that Iran should be a strategic ally to a more guarded view—are due not so much
to changes in the international situation as to internal
changes in Russia. The more guarded approach to
Iran reflects increasing internal tension between ethnic
Russians, still the majority of the Russian elite, and the
Russian Islamic community. The persistence and likely
increase of this tension is one of the most important
reasons why a Russian/Iranian relationship would be
guarded and pragmatic, barring some unforeseeable
turns of events.
This monograph focuses on the Russian elite’s perception of Iran and its geostrategic posture. It deals
with the actual implementation of policies only insofar
as this helps elucidate the images of Iran and the ideological aspect of the Russian/Iranian relationship. The
Russian elite are divided into two major groups.
1. The first level makes decisions or plays a
considerable role in making decisions. It includes the
president, his advisors, influential think tanks, and
intellectuals who basically shape the ideology of the
government.
2. The second level could be defined as the legitimate
opposition. These people criticize the upper ruling
echelon, yet they share some of the premises of the
ruling elite’s ideology or at least believe that policy can
be changed in the future. The ruling elite tolerates them
and to some extent provides them a way of influencing
public opinion and thus influencing the ruling elite’s
decisions. These people have been allowed to occupy
positions in governing bodies such as the Duma and
the Russian parliament; appear on TV; and publish
newspapers with comparatively wide circulation.
The influence of this second layer of the elite is also

vi

enhanced by the wide circulation of their books and
the frequency with which their ideas are discussed in
cyberspace.
The monograph considers the dynamics of the
Russian view of the elite and the role of both external
and internal variables in the changes of images. The
role of both sets of variables makes it possible to
gauge the sustainability of this or that trend and make
predictions about the future.
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RUSSIAN ELITE IMAGE OF IRAN:
FROM LATE SOVIET ERA TO PRESENT
INTRODUCTION
The Goal of the Project.
The goal of this project is to trace the evolution of
the Russian elite’s view of Iran over the past 20 years
of post-Soviet history. This knowledge will help characterize the elite’s present vision of Iran in the context
of Russia’s geopolitical posture. The major thesis and
outcome are as follows.
During most of the late Soviet and post-Soviet period, two major trends in the approach to Iran have
dominated the Russian elite. The first emphasizes the
strategic importance of Russia’s rapprochement with
Iran. This view is mostly supported by Russian Imperial Nationalists, notably those defined as “Eurasianists.” For these groups, an Iran-Russia rapprochement
should not be a temporary use of Iran as a bargaining
chip in dealing with the West, but a permanent alliance.
The second group believes that Russia should use
Iran as a bargaining chip in dealing with the United
States and as a useful trade partner, but not a permanent ally. Supporters of this view usually see Russia either as a self-contained country or as close to the West,
mostly Europe.
Eurasianism and similar brands of Russian nationalism became popular starting in the early Soviet era,
reaching a peak by the beginning of the Vladimir Putin
era. By then, elements of Eurasianism had been integrated into the ideology of the upper echelon of the
elite, including Putin. Thoughts about a possible, at
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least loose, strategic alliance with Iran were also becoming popular. Yet soon after the beginning of Putin’s tenure, an opposite trend started to develop, and
skepticism toward Iran and its relationship with Russia grew. This trend has dominated the Russian elite’s
approach to Iran to the present, regardless of the vacillation in Russian foreign policy. One might assume
this would dominate the elite’s view at least for the
near future.
The changes in the Russian elite’s approach to
Iran—from the assumption that Iran should be a strategic ally to a more guarded view—are due not so much
to changes in the international situation as to internal
changes in Russia. The more guarded approach to
Iran reflects increasing internal tension between ethnic
Russians, still the majority of the Russian elite, and the
Russian Islamic community. The persistence and likely
increase of this tension is one of the most important
reasons why a Russian/Iranian relationship would be
guarded and pragmatic, barring some unforeseeable
turns of events.
Methodology.
This monograph focuses on the Russian elite’s
perception of Iran and its geostrategic posture. It deals
with the actual implementation of policies only insofar
as this helps elucidate the images of Iran and the
ideological aspect of the Russian/Iranian relationship.
The monograph deals with the elite, who are divided
into two major groups.
• The first level makes decisions or plays a
considerable role in making decisions. It
includes the president, his advisors, influential
think tanks, and intellectuals who basically
shape the ideology of the government.
2

• The second level could be defined as the
legitimate opposition. These people criticize the
upper ruling echelon, yet they share some of
the premises of the ruling elite’s ideology or at
least believe that policy can be changed in the
future. The ruling elite tolerates them and to
some extent provides them a way of influencing
public opinion and thus influencing the ruling
elite’s decisions. These people have been
allowed to occupy positions in governing bodies
such as the Duma, the Russian parliament;
appear on TV; and publish newspapers with
comparatively wide circulation. The influence
of this second layer of the elite is also enhanced
by the wide circulation of their books and the
frequency with which their ideas are discussed
in cyberspace.
The monograph considers the dynamics of the
Russian view of the elite and the role of both external
and internal variables in the changes of images. The
role of both sets of variables makes it possible to
gauge the sustainability of this or that trend and make
predictions about the future.
Sources.
Sources for this monograph are related to our
definition of the elite. At the beginning of the postSoviet era, the mass media were genuinely free and
people in various positions of society could make
their views known, but the situation had changed by
the Putin and Putin/Dimitry Medvedev era. Major
outlets—mass media and increasingly even the Internet,
at least those sources whose servers were controlled
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by Russian authorities—had become controlled by the
government. Their very existence indicates that at least
some ideas in the mass media represent the views of
the authorities.
The sources for elite opinions in the Boris Yeltsin
era are more complex due to the existence of several,
often mutually antagonistic, groups of elite. Consider
Yeltsin with mostly pro-Western views and policies
and a Duma dominated by Communists. One could,
of course, argue that Yeltsin had much more power
than the Duma, especially after fall 1993, when he used
violence to suppress the opposition. Yet the Duma was
not entirely powerless at the time of the economic crisis
of 1998—caused by the devaluation of the ruble—and
played an important role in shaping regime policy. At
that time, one could define the elite as not just those in
government circles but also as a variety of intellectuals
and politicians whose views were broadly known and
testified to by the circulation of their ideas in the mass
media, the popularity of their books, and discussions
on the Internet.
As noted above, the Russian elite’s approach
to Iran, how it is seen in the elite’s discourse, has
undergone two major developments. From the end
of the Soviet era to approximately the beginning
of Putin’s presidency, one could see the increasing
influence of the idea that Russia and Iran should be
strategic allies. The opposite trend can be seen from
approximately the middle of Putin’s first term to the
present. The view of the Russian elite toward Iran is
directly connected with the influence of Eurasianism,
the doctrine in which Russia’s relationship with Asia,
and, for some representatives of the creed, Iran first of
all, plays a very important role. Thus, the emergence
and evolution of doctrines, especially in the late and

4

post-Soviet modifications, play the most important
role for our monograph.
THE BIRTH OF THE EURASIAN MODEL
Throughout the last Shah’s regime, Iran was seen
as one of the major American allies in the Middle East,
and its relationship with the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) was rather cold. It is true that after
the Revolution of 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini
proclaimed that the United States was a “big Satan.”
But the USSR was also evil, though to a lesser degree.
By the time of Mikhail Gorbachev, however, the
relationship was improving markedly, and the trend
continued through the Yeltsin era. And the increasing
popularity of the idea that Iran could be not merely
a customer for Russian weapons and knowhow but
also a strategic ally was intimately connected with the
popularity of Eurasianism, which gained momentum
despite the overall pro-Western, and especially proAmerican, orientation of the beginning of the Yeltsin
regime.
The increasing popularity of Eurasianism and
related doctrines can be understood by looking at
the sociopolitical backdrop of the Yeltsin regime.
Gorbachev’s reforms, which soon became translated
into an anti-Communist revolution, had originally
been hailed by the majority of the population as the
pathway to a better future. Western skeptics who
believed that Russia was doomed to authoritarianism/
totalitarianism started to change their minds.1 They
were supported by rising numbers of the late Soviet
and post-Soviet elite, who regarded the weakening of
the state—in the case of the disintegration of the USSR,
the end of the state—as a prerequisite for privatization.2
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One might add that while the emerging new Russian
elite was concerned with nothing but wealth—and for
this reason was strongly for continuous privatization—
Western observers assumed that privatization was
needed for making the Soviet and later Russian
economy more efficient.3 The elite, as well as the
general masses, openly proclaimed their admiration
for the West, mostly the United States, and regarded it
as the model to follow.
At the same time, the opposition to the regime—
those who are usually dubbed the “Red to Brown”—
an alliance of Nationalist-minded Communists and
open Nationalists—blasted Yeltsin for the destruction
of the USSR. Their emphasis was not so much on the
socio-economic ills brought by the changes but by the
fact that Gorbachev-Yeltsin had together destroyed
the USSR, the great state, the end result of hundreds of
years of history.4
The emphasis on the imperial mission of the USSR
but not on its social achievements—in the official
Soviet ideology, the USSR had been the beacon for
all the oppressed—could well be seen by the fact that
not Vladimir Lenin, but Josef Stalin emerged as the
major hero of the Soviet era.5 At the very beginning
of the Yeltsin regime, this notion and philosophy were
resolutely discarded, and a strong state, in the Soviet
era and even pre-revolutionary Russia, was seen as a
source of evil and problems for Russian society. But as
time progressed, the idea of the strong state started to
percolate in the minds of the elite and the population.
For the elite, appreciation of the strong state was
mostly due to the fact that privatization was completed,
and the increasing anarchical/criminal aspect of
Russian life not only prevented the elite from holding
its spoils but created a problem even for physical
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security.6 The populace was also deeply disappointed
with the changes, but craved stability and increasingly
looked with nostalgia at Soviet life. The growing
appreciation for the strong state as guarantor of basic
order had led to the appeal of a strong authoritarian
leader—the increasing popularity of General Sergey
Nikolayevich Lebed was a sign of this process.7
Appreciation for the strong state also led to the
reemergence of ambition for making the country a
strong power again. Eurasianism provided a geopolitical model, at least on the level of ideological
discourse, that no traditional Russian model could
offer. Certainly, it was the most viable alternative to
Slavophilism that the Russian ruler actively employed,
either as the sole ideological paradigm or, more often,
the essential ingredient of the geopolitical doctrine that
justified Russian foreign policy and its notion of being
a grand power.
While distinctly different, Eurasianism is still
generically related to Slavophilism, and a short
description of Slavophilism is needed for a full
understanding of Eurasianism. The basic element of
the creed, born in the 19th century, was the assumption
that Slavs, particularly Orthodox Slavs, are endowed
with special qualities due to their special moral and
religious characteristics. Pan-Slavism—evolved from
Slavophilism—saw Russia as the natural protector
of Slavs and the cementing force of Slavic unity, an
idea quite popular among Russian intellectuals in
the latter part of the 19th century.8 This doctrine was
often employed by Russian tsars in the 19th century
and increasingly used by Stalin, especially during and
after World War II.9 By that time, Slavophilism/PanSlavophilism played quite an important role in official
ideology. It provided one of the strongest ideological
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justifications for the unity of the Slavic core of the
former USSR and, of course, additional ideological
justification for Soviet domination in East Europe,
which was mostly Slavic.10 Here, the USSR presented
itself as a mostly Russian/Slavic state par excellence.
This construction was part of the ideology for some
members of the Russian elite in the Yeltsin era as well.
One manifestation was the alliance with Alexander
Lukashenko’s Belorussia. Lukashenko was the only
leader of a post-Soviet state who openly lamented the
end of the USSR and wished to unite with Russia. Indeed,
an agreement was signed that supposedly led to the
creation of a unified state in the future. But the alliance
with Belorussia was rather an exception; most Slavic
nations moved in the opposite direction, including
Ukraine, which most Russians saw as an integral
part of Russian civilization due to the similarities of
language, culture, and, of course, historical tradition.
As a matter of fact, traditional Russian historiography
regarded Kiev, capital of Ukraine, as the “mother of
Russian cities.” Still, even at the beginning of Yeltsin’s
tenure, Ukraine wavered between Russia and the West;
and Crimea, with major Russian naval bases, created
additional problems.11
While Ukraine was not sure about its geopolitical
affiliation and a considerable number of Ukrainians
looked at the West, this was even more the case
with Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Not just the
“perfidious Poles,” historically at odds with tsarist
Russia and its successor, the USSR, but even Bulgaria,
historically more pro-Russian and Orthodox, opted
for the West.12 They clamored to be part of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and then
became much more critical toward Russia than older
NATO members. These East European states—until
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recently, all members of the Warsaw Pact—proclaimed
that, regardless of the changes of regime, Russia was
essentially the same: an Asiatic power deeply hostile
to the West. In the emerging spiritual vacuum and in
a search for alliance, increasing numbers of Russian
intellectuals, and members of the elite in general,
turned to Eurasianism—the philosophical and political
doctrine that had emerged among Russian émigrés in
the 1920s.13
Similar to many other creeds, historical, or classical,
Eurasianism is similar to its later modifications. Still,
Eurasianism was a controversial teaching, and one observer stated with an air of irony that there were as
many “Eurasianisms” as Eurasians.14 Still, Eurasianists
shared some common beliefs. They all assumed that
Russia/the USSR belongs neither to West Europe nor
to the Slavic world but is a civilization in its own right.
At the same time, they discarded the narrow Russocentrism, especially in its racist version, where Russianness is defined through biology/blood. Russian
civilization, in their interpretation, is a unique blend of
Orthodox Russians and Muslims, mostly of Turkic origin, and its borders roughly coincide with the territory
of the former empire of the tsars, later, the USSR. Eurasianists—and here they also departed sharply from
the vast majority of Russian historians—regard not so
much Kievan Russia (Rus’) but the Mongol Empire as
the true founder of the Russian state.
It was not accidental that Nikolai Trubetskoy, one
of the founders of Eurasianism and one of the most
prominent modern linguists, regards the Russian state
as directly evolving from the Mongolian empire.15
The Eurasianists were also quite different from many
European observers who, throughout the 19th and
20th centuries, while acknowledging the Mongols’
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contribution to Russian statehood, saw in it the
damnation of Asianism. The Eurasianist approach to
the Mongols was altogether different. The Mongols/
Tartars were transformed from being one of the greatest
evils that had befallen Russia to its deliverer, and there
was a sharp reevaluation of the Mongol heritage.16 The
Mongols were praised for keeping together the multiethnic empire and promulgating ethnic, religious,
and cultural symbiosis, and also for giving Russia the
healthy traditions of authoritarian rule and a certain
disregard for the material blessings that were the
driving force for the West. The Mongols, Eurasianists
implied, instilled Russians with “ideocracy,” certain
metagoals unrelated to material interests. The point
is that the elite state created by the Mongols was not
driven by purely economic goals but by some high
spiritual goals; it was not accidental that Eurasianists
emphasized the Mongols’ respect for religion and
their benevolent view of Orthodoxy (one should point
out that both pre-World War II Eurasianists and their
immediate postwar successors regarded Orthodoxy as
an essential aspect of Russian/Eurasian civilization).17
Eurasianists and their ideology were sort of a
derivative or modified copy of Soviet ideology. They
talked about what had happened in Soviet Russia/
the USSR without Marxist-Leninist and later Stalinist
jargon. They actually pointed out that Soviet democracy
was in reality a totalitarian regime closer to the rule
of the Mongols than to anything else. What the Soviet
elite promulgated as “proletariat internationalism”
was nothing but a sort of integration of the various
ethnic groups in a quasi-nation of a sort—”Soviet
people.” The ideology of the regime—at least what it
officially promulgated, the building of communism
and the spread of socialist revolution globally—had

10

a striking resemblance to religious creeds, including
those preached by Orthodoxy. It was not surprising
that critics called Eurasianists a sort of “Orthodox
Bolsheviks.”
Eurasianism was popular among the Russian émigré
community in the 1920s, especially among officers
of the White armies who escaped abroad and émigré
youth. All of them, though rejecting the Communist
regime in Russia, were deeply disenchanted with
Western capitalism. But in Russia proper, it was almost
unknown. Some books and articles reached Russian
readers, but their numbers and influence were quite
limited, especially after the 1930s, when contact with
the West was minimal. Even Lev Gumilev, called the
last classical Eurasianist who lived in the USSR, had
developed his own idiosyncratic form of Eurasianism,
basically independent of foreign influence. Later in his
life, he engaged in correspondence with Peter Savitsky,
one of the movement’s founders, who lived in Prague,
where he had developed the major premises of his
version of Eurasianism. Gumilev was employed as an
academician in the USSR, and, to avoid conflict with the
authorities, focused his research on the early medieval
nomadic people of Eurasia and their interactions with
Russians/Slavs in general.18
Still, Gumilev’s theory was too unorthodox. For
example, following some adherents of “Russian
cosmism,” he believed in direct influence of cosmic
energy on the historical process. And his past—he was
imprisoned for a long time during the Stalin era and
both his parents were repressed by the authorities—
made his intellectual life quite uneasy. He published
very little during the Soviet era, and, while he acquired
a number of dedicated followers, the general public,
even the educated ones, did not know about him and
his ideas.
11

The situation changed dramatically by the end of
Gorbachev’s reforms when Gumilev became one of
the most popular writers in the Soviet Union and later
in post-Soviet Russia.19 His works, most written or
at least conceived long ago, were published in huge
numbers and have continued to be on best-seller lists.20
His ideas have percolated in the minds of average
Russian intellectuals for all this time. His expression/
definition of “passionarnost” (passionary, passion,
drive) became so popular that it has become firmly
imbedded in the Russian language. Indeed, “His
peculiar vocabulary dominates virtually all history,
ethnology, and ‘culturology’.”21 Even those who had
no idea of Gumilev’s views or of Eurasianism used it.
The popularity of Gumilev could be explained
by many factors. One could, of course, argue that it
was just part of the broad popularity of all writers,
philosophers, and others who were not accessible
by the Soviet public. But this could not fully explain
Gumilev’s appeal at a time when the popularity of this
sort of books had declined. His Eurasianism addressed
the longings of a considerable part of the Russian
population, those disenchanted with the emerging
post-Soviet order with all its vagaries of capitalism, and
increasing alarms that the calamities were brought on
by outside forces.22 In short, Gumilev’s interpretation
of Eurasianism became an essential ingredient of the
ideological alternative to the construction proposed by
the West. Indeed, the domination of Western ideology
in its American interpretation was not complete; and
there was a great deal of resistance to it among a
considerable part of the population.
In this early popularity of late Soviet Eurasianism,
Iran played little role, and the writings of a few
classical/prewar Eurasianists such as Vasili P. Nikitin,

12

who were interested in Iran, seem to have had little, if
any, influence.23 This ignoring of Iran in late Soviet and
emerging post-Soviet Russian Eurasianism was not
accidental. Not only were both prewar Eurasianists and
Gumilev basically inward-looking, limiting Eurasia to
the territory of the Russian empire/USSR—but the era
of the collapsing empire and regime and the general
feeling of mixed anxiety, hope, and despondency
did not include ventures outside the Soviet, or what
was so recently the Soviet, borders. In this context,
Eurasianism was hardly an ideology of empire. The
stress was on an ideology that provided justification
for the preservation of the USSR or reassembling it in
the near future.
Yet a new version of Eurasianism was emerging.
And for its proponents, Iran became one of the
major elements of geopolitical design, especially for
Alexander Dugin.
INTEGRATION OF IRAN IN EURASIANISM/
NATIONALISTIC DISCOURSE AND
GERMINATION OF THE IDEA OF A RUSSIAN/
IRANIAN AXIS
Aleksandr Dugin, the son of Soviet intelligence officials,24 did not receive a formal education, but he had
a gift for foreign languages. Because of his family connection, he had access to books in “special holdings”
(spetskhran) and similar collections that were not open
to the general public and not accessible to the average
Russian reader. A detailed analysis of the sources of
Dugin’s intellectual development is beyond the scope
of this monograph. But some of the most important elements should be noted. First was the work of major
20th-century geopoliticians such as Sir Halford John
Mackinder and Karl Haushofer. From them, he picked
13

up the idea of the fundamental role of geographical
position as the force that defined the nature of the state
and corresponding societies’ political culture and aspirations. He divided states into maritime and continental powers, with entirely different political cultures.
Maritime powers developed trade and had economic
interests as the major motivation for their activities.
Continental states disregarded economic interests as
subordinate to a higher goal, to create a great empire,
not seen as a source of enrichment. Here Dugin, of
course, implicitly refers to the USSR. The expansion of
the Soviet empire would bring no economic benefits,
neither for the Soviet population nor for the elite itself.
Conflict between a maritime power and a continental
power is inevitable, and one or the other of them will
perish.
The second important ingredient of Dugin’s
philosophy is the European “New Right.” This
fascination with right-wing European philosophers
and politicians has tempted those who study Dugin
to attribute to him all the characteristics of these
diverse groups of politicians and ideologists, and
the differences are often ignored. Indeed, those who
elaborate on Dugan’s interests, his intellectual/
political trends, often equate him with neo-Nazis, or
plainly fascists. There are definite grounds for this
assumption, because Dugin clearly had an attraction
to fascism/Nazism, especially in the early period of
his intellectual and spiritual development. One might
therefore expect Dugin to be a racist, for racism was the
backbone of the Nazi philosophy. Racism, however,
was entirely absent from Dugin’s philosophy. The
“New Right” fascinated him because of its rejection of
the sheer utilitarianism of everyday life in the modern
West, individualism, what he saw as the colorless
emptiness of human existence without a high goal, the
14

discarding of traditions. There was no place for racism
in this design. Moreover, Dugin implicitly saw racism
as one of the major reasons the Third Reich project
collapsed. Here is where Eurasianism entered the scene,
a philosophy of the great Russian empire based on the
symbiosis of Orthodox Russians and people of other
ethnicities, mostly Muslim, and free from Nazi racist
blunders. In a way, Eurasianism became the central
aspect of Dugin’s outlook because of the internal logic
of his narrative.
Dugin regarded the grand corporate state as the
pinnacle of the historical process. This state dissolves
personal appetites in serving the high interests of the
state, seen as an interwoven fabric maintaining cultural
identity in the form of the “eternal present”25 and
endless expansion. Expansion and war are important,
not only because of the expansion of the imperial
domain, the essential goal of any grand state but also
because war instills society with the sense of sacrifice
and despise of death. War, here, is a great spiritualizer
of society, a sort of religious experience, a peculiar
type of religious rite. Dugin saw this spiritualized and
collectivistic aspect of the regime in the Third Reich
and implied that it could be a model for humanity, a
force that would vanquish the Atlantic civilization of
the capitalist United States, the arch-symbol of evil in
Dugin’s mind.
Dugin sees several reasons for the Third Reich
engagement and ultimate debacle in war with the
USSR/Russia. First, of course, the conniving Atlantic/
maritime civilization dragged potentially friendly
powers—Stalinist USSR and Nazi Germany—into
fraternal conflict, in which the continental Nazi regime
had perished in a geopolitical Gotterdammerung at the
hands of its potential ally.26 But it was not just the
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conniving enemies of the continental powers that led
them to brutal conflict. There were serious problems
with the entire Nazi design. The Nazi leaders, at least
some of them, failed to understand that “Aryanization”
is not a racial/biological, but a spiritual/cultural
phenomenon.27 People of the continental landmass
are all pretty much the same in their basic cultural/
spiritual matrix and should be together. And it was in
the USSR, not Nazi Germany, where the “conservative
revolution”—Eurasianists were seen as akin to the
European “New Right”—finally materialized, in many
ways because of the absence of rigid racism and a drive
for healthy symbiosis of all indigenous people of the
Russian/Eurasian space.
In Dugin’s view, the Bolsheviks engaged in
building along the lines of the “New Right” without
understanding it. One should not regard Russian
Marxists as people who followed the traditions of the
West and built a society that was a higher form than
Western capitalism. Marxists in Russia, regardless of
their rhetoric, actually followed or reaffirmed Russian
traditions. In Russia, indeed, the strong power, the high
goal of building the perfect society (communism), and
finally the peaceful coexistence of Russians and various
ethnic groups all embraced traditional Russian/
Eurasian values. Dugin implied that this leap into
the future was confirmation of Russia’s very essence
as a Eurasian power; the country of ever present, so
to speak, conservative revolution; the dreams of a
“New Right”; and similar trends. In a way, the Soviet
regime was structurally similar to the Third Reich free
from Nazi blunders because of its internationalist/
Eurasianist underpinning.28
Thus, the major elements of Dugin’s philosophy
implied the Eurasian nature of the Russian state as
the framework of its historical existence. This Eur16

asian nature was an eternal presence of “conservative revolution.” It also implied eternal Russian conflict as a continental Eurasian power, with the United
States as its major enemy. The primordial nature of
the conflict implied that one or the other would be
victorious; the United States would not stop at marginalization and destruction of the USSR, but proceed
till Russia fell apart. The attempt to destroy Russia/
Eurasia is not driven not by economic interest but by
the desire to homogenize the world according to the
American model. Americanization of Eurasia/Russia
would mean the complete destruction of its civilizational core. U.S. confrontation was Russia’s inevitable
destiny, but it could not fight alone and needed an ally.
Dugin, contrary to classical 1920s Eurasianists, did not
discard Europe. East Europeans—Slavic “brothers” of
Slavophiles and Pan-Slavists—were discarded as U.S.
proxies, but France and Germany were praised as Eurasian powers; here of course, Dugin, along with other
Russian pundits, had noted the beginning of discord
between Europe and the United States. Still, with all
his appreciation of those that Donald Rumsfeld would
later dub the “old Europe,” Dugin did not see them as
fully imbedded in Eurasian civilization. Their geopolitical position, culture, and posture were not always
totally Eurasian; and they could waver.
The story was quite different with Iran. As noted
above, traditional/classical Eurasianists paid little
attention to Iran, albeit there was some interest. It was
of even less interest to Gumilev, who could touch on
in passion. The story was different for Dugin, who
regarded Iran as the staunchest Russian ally outside
the countries of the former USSR, where Kazakhstan
had been Dugin’s darling for a long time.29 Dugin was
quite heartened by the fact that Nursultan Nazarbaev,
who put forward the idea of an “Eurasian Union,” saw
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him as possibly the leader of Eurasian unification, at
least in the territory of the former USSR.30 Dugin’s high
expectations from Nazarbaev fit well, in general, for a
friendly relationship between Russia and Kazakhstan.31
While a Eurasian Union with Kazakhstan would
provide the nucleus of the reassembling of the USSR
under the disguise of an Eurasian Union, the appeal to
Iran had implied a much grander design; it revealed
an important aspect of Duginian Eurasianism and, of
course, the segment of the Russian elite which shares
it.
As has been noted, Eurasianism in both its classic
prewar and later “Gumilevian” interpretations basically
saw Russia/Eurasia as a self-contained unity. Russia/
Eurasia was constrained by geographical, cultural,
and “bio-cosmical” limits—at least in Gumilevia
interpretations—and had no desire to spread outside
this geopolitical niche to the outside world. References
to the Mongols implied a sort of quest for global
predominance, but it was rather subdued; the emphasis
was on self-contained Eurasian/Russian civilization.
One of the major reasons why even “Gumilevian”
Eurasianism was not imperial was that Russian
nationalists who wished to see Russia/the USSR as
an imperial power could find a niche in the official
or semi-official Soviet ideology, with its emphasis on
the USSR’s duty “to help” the oppressed all over the
world. This appeal to duty to spread socialism was a
fig leaf for purely imperial designs.
The ideological vacuum after the collapse of the
USSR and, consequently, of Soviet imperialism was
filled with various ideological doctrines, Duginian
modifications of Eurasianism among them. In Dugin’s
view, Eurasianism should lead not just to unification
of the USSR under a new name but to an imperial
web that would make Russia even more powerful
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than the former USSR, a match for the “Atlantic” U.S.
civilization. And here Iran’s role was critical. For Dugin,
Iran had emerged as a full continental power that could
fully follow in Russia’s continental tradition, much
different from other Muslim countries in the region,
some of which—such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia—
had become just tools of the Americans.32 From this
perspective, Dugin fully appreciated the Revolution of
1979, which had returned Iran to its tradition. Alliance
with Iran was seen as a key cementing force for the
future. Dugin also assumed that Russia should help
Iran become a nuclear power. His assumption was that
a nuclear Iran would create problems not for Russia but
for the United States, the real threat to both countries.
One can, of course, question the degree to which
these ideas influenced the views of the early Yeltsin
elite. Yeltsin and those close to him at that time were
strongly pro-Western, mostly pro-American. The idea
of the resurrection of a mighty Eurasian empire where
imperial power was a goal in itself was absolutely
foreign, not just on the level of practical actions—which
were actually in the opposite direction—but even on
the level of ideology. It was the Communist-Nationalist
opposition to the regime that promulgated the crucial
importance of the mighty state. And it was not accidental
that Dugin was close to the opposition. He published
articles in the newspaper Den, later renamed Zavtra,
the major vehicle of the “Red to Brown” opposition.
Later, Dugin stated he was close to Communist leader
Gennadi Zyuganov;33 at least he later claimed that he
was on the side of those who wanted to overthrow the
Yeltsin regime in the fall 1993 Moscow uprising. By
that time, Zyuganov was using Eurasianist-sounding
motifs in his lexicon, and Eurasian ideas, including
the importance of an alliance with Muslim countries,
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including Iran, could be easily noted in the general
discourse of the Communist opposition.
One could, of course, argue that this should not
be of big interest to the Communist position, which
was extremely precarious after the botched 1993
uprising. There was the feeling that Yeltsin, who had
acquired practically dictatorial powers upon crushing
the opposition and shelling the Parliament building
(the White House), could well put the very existence
of Communists to an end. Moreover, those who had
participated in the rebellion were imprisoned, at least
for a while, and some members of the opposition
were concerned with their physical security. There
were persistent rumors that hundreds of defenders
of the White House had been executed and their
bodies cremated to avoid evidence of atrocities by
the regime. Their reasoning is understandable if we
remember that some members of the revolt intended to
eliminate Yeltsin and his entourage in case of victory.
Thus, the views on Iran of Communists and other
members of the opposition might have been ignored
as rather marginal. However, there was evidence that
Eurasianist-sounding ideas—with the assumption that
Russia was to be a great imperial power with Iran as
an essential ally––had percolated into the public mind
and reached the minds of some members of the Russian
elite.
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, for example, became the
leader of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), most
likely the creation of the Yeltsin elite as a way of moving
the electorate away from the still potentially dangerous
Communists. He eagerly exploited a populace increasingly disappointed with socioeconomic changes.34
Zhirinovsky’s ideology included some aspects of the
Communist paradigm. He argued that Russia should
be an empire much bigger than the former USSR.
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The key element of this future grand Russia would
be domination of the south, implicitly in the Iranian
direction. He declared that Russia soldiers will “wash
their feet in the warm water of the Indian Ocean” in his
book The Final Thrust to the South, which highlighted
the importance of Russia’s focus on the south, including Iran. The phrase became quite popular.35 Zhirinovsky stressed the importance of access to the Indian
Ocean and lately emphasized pro-Iranian sympathy—
he later published a book on Iran. He implied that a
Russian alliance with Iran should be reinforced with
a similar alliance with Europe—of course seen as
a pro-Russian, anti-American force. Zhirinovsky’s
strong relationship with some of the European right
sounded quite in the vein of Duginian Eurasianism.36
His views could well be regarded as eccentric; in the
future he would make a name as the most bizarre and
unpredictable member of the Russian elite. Still, in the
1994 election just after Yeltsin’s suppression of the 1993
rebellion, he would claim almost a quarter of the seats
in the Duma. This indicated that Zhirinovsky’s ideas,
including the importance of not moving away from
the West but at least counterbalancing the direction of
Russian foreign policy with Eastern/Asian directions,
with Iran as the most important player, was popular.
Whereas a pro-Iranian view, in the context of latent
imperial dreams, so to speak, might circulate among
a considerable segment of the populace and what one
could call the quasi-elite, rapprochement with Iran could
also be seen on a practical level. These practical actions
were not actually related to ideological Pro-Iranianism;
Zhirinovsky, despite his stupendous parliamentary
victory, had a minuscule influence on real politics.
In no way did the Yeltsin regime at that time strive
to move toward Iran simply for the sake of exerting
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power. The desire was simple—for cash. The decline
of Russian industry, including weapons production
and loss of funding for science, created a great need
for a market for Russian knowhow, technology, and
weapons. In addition, there was a great demand for
dollars in the face of the precipitously declining ruble.
All this pushed the Russian elite toward Iran, if not
ideologically at least in practical actions.
Russia started to sell sophisticated weapons to
Iran,37 most importantly, the Bushehr nuclear plant
project. The Iranian nuclear program from which
Bushehr would eventually emerge was launched
long ago, even before the Iranian Revolution, and, as
Russian observers admitted, by none other than the
United States. In 1968, the United States provided Iran
with a nuclear reactor.38 The reactor laid the foundation
for more ambitious plans; and in 1974 Iran signed
an agreement with China to address nuclear energy
needs; China also was to help Iran to find uranium.39
Argentina was also involved and signed an agreement
with Iran to build a factory for uranium enrichment.40
A German firm launched the plant building in the mid1970s. But, after the Revolution of 1979 and the IranIraq war, a Western firm abandoned Bushehr, not only
because Iran had become something of an international
pariah but also because it was involved in a bloody war
with Iraq during which Bushehr was bombed several
times.41 With no Western option available, the Iranians
approached the Russians, who agreed to help. The
agreement was signed in 1989, when the USSR was
already near its end—as was clear retrospectively.42
In 1992, soon after the collapse of the USSR, a new
agreement was signed.
While attracted by the prospects of cash, the Russian
elite was reluctant to sign a contract, since it would
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clearly irritate the Americans, and apparently there
were second thoughts about actual implementation
of the plans. The emphasis was on the essentially
peaceful nature of Russia’s cooperation with Iran, at
least according to Z. M. Zadonsky, Russian specialist
in Russian-Iranian relations.43 Zadonsky implied that
in both agreements Bushehr was not the issue. It was
only later that Russia started to cooperate with Iran on
other matters.44 As Zadonsky rightfully stated, nuclear
cooperation had nothing to do with an attempt to
create problems for the United States but was driven
exclusively by economic considerations, especially the
desire to create jobs.45 Members of the elite signaled
that they would be happy to forget the Iranian proposal
if they were sufficiently compensated.46 When in 1995
they found out that they would not receive anything
comparable to the Iranian offer,47 they decided to
proceed with the deal.
The construction of Bushehr brought Russia tangible
economic benefits, at least for those employed on the
project. According to some reports, they earned salaries
up to $20,000 per month.48 But the project proceeded
slowly, and problems emerged barely 2 years after
the agreement was signed. Iranian officials stated that
it would pay only after part of the project was done;
Russia insisted that Iran pay first.49 According to
Mark Smith, “Delays in delivering the first plant—first
ordered in the mid-1990s—have been a source of friction
between Iran and Russia.”50 It was not surprising that
the completion deadline was not met. Moreover, there
were signs that the regime wanted to maintain a good
relationship with Washington and preserve Russia’s
image as staunchly behind the West; and the regime
sent a message that it was willing to cool its relationship
with Iran. In 1995, U.S. Vice President Al Gore and
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Russian prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin signed
an agreement stipulating the end of Russia’s sale of
Russian weapons to Iran—a thorny problem in the
American/Russian relationship by 2000. Presumably
by that time, the existing contracts would expire, and
no new ones would be signed.
LATE YELTSIN ERA: INCREASING POPULARITY
OF EURASIANISM AND PLAN FOR A RUSSIAN/
IRANIAN AXIS
In 1996, when Yeltsin was reelected, the proAmerican, in general pro-Western, course of the
regime seemed fully entrenched. But interest was
becoming evident in the Eurasian model, with Iran
emerging as one of the most important Russian allies
in counterbalancing the United States. There was a
profusion of Russian publications on Eurasianism,
including those that discussed a Russian/Iranian axis.
Interest in Iran, deeply connected with the
assumption that Russia could reemerge as a great
power, could be seen in the ideology of the elite.
There was increasing popularity of the gosudarstveniki
(state builders), those who regard the state as having
great value for Russia. Supporters of this approach
believe a strong state is essential for the stability of
society but also for Russia’s international position. The
importance of a strong state as a way to ensure Russia’s
international position went along with changes in the
Russian/American relationship. On the surface, the
relationship continued to be stable, and the Yeltsin
elite continued to emphasize that Russia was part of
the Western order, all problems notwithstanding. But
there were increasing signs of tension. This was mostly
because, despite earlier promises, the West decided to
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expand NATO and include East European states, all
former members of the Warsaw Pact. The idea that a
strong Russian state is needed for potential conflict with
NATO moved from intellectual opposition discourse
to mainstream ideological construction.
This went along with the increasing popularity of
an ideological construction taken by the regime from
the intellectual arsenal of the opposition: that the Cold
War had nothing to do with totalitarian Communist
ideology versus Western democratic capitalism. The
conflict was of geopolitical or civilizational nature, and,
regardless of political/ideological changes, the West
would be hostile to Russia as a foreign civilization. The
assumption went along with similar trends in the West
and the popularity of Samuel P. Huntington’s ideas
about the clash of civilizations. At that point, with
the ideology of the opposition increasingly integrated
in official discourse, Eurasianism became extremely
popular. This could be seen by the profusion of
publications on the subject not just in opposition and
marginal publications, but in respectable academic
journals and influential publishing houses. Above all,
it could be seen in Dugin’s position. From a staunch
oppositionist to the regime as a force deeply hostile to
the resurrection of Russia/Eurasia as the mighty power
and the rebels who were ready to fight the regime in fall
1993, he increasingly moved, if not to the mainstream,
at least to part of the legitimate opposition. He became
an adviser to Duma speaker Genadii Seleznev.
Dugin’s magnum opus, The Foundation of Geopolitics,
became increasingly popular and had new editions.51
The introduction was authored by General Nikolai
Klokotov, and the book was used as a textbook at the
Academy of General Staff. Dugin received access to
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television and mainstream publications and continued
to publish in many media, including books.52 He had
a teaching job in the so-called New University, and
later published his lectures.53 In all his writings, Iran
emerged as the ally most essential for Russia’s future
greatness.
Similar views were broadly held by Nationalistminded elite members who, though in opposition to
the Yeltsin regime, continued to occupy important
positions in various segments of Russian society. For
them—they could be defined as imperial Nationalists—
Russia as a great power was the most important plan
for the future. Indeed, some top Yeltsin advisors
proposed an alliance with Iran as most important
for Russia’s future as a great power.54 Most of them
thought in purely geopolitical terms, seeing Russia in
mortal conflict with the West, especially the United
States, regardless of political makeup.
General Leonid Ivashov, a three-star general
who had occupied an important position on Russia’s
General Staff and who was responsible for the
relationship between the Russian army and the outside
world, thought in geopolitical terms, quite close to
Eurasianism. Ivashov had started his military and
intellectual career long before the dramatic changes
that befell the USSR, and continued to be very much
a part of the military establishment.55 Gorbachev’s
reforms and the increasing instability in the country
hardly pleased Ivashov, and the end of the USSR was
clearly a great tragedy for him. In the fateful days of
the August 1991 coup, his heart was with Marshal
Iazov, the USSR Minister of Defense, who with other
members of the GKChP tried to save the Soviet Union
from disintegration.56

26

On the emergence of post-Soviet Russia, Ivashov
joined the opposition to the pro-Western Yeltsin regime.
At that point he and other members of the nationalistic
opposition fell under the influence of Eurasianism, and
the influence of that doctrine and general geopolitical
point of reference could be easily detected in his works
in the late Yeltsin period.57 A general acquaintance with
Dugin, who by the end of the Yeltsin era was trying to
forge a relationship with the military brass, possibly
also played a role in instilling Ivashov’s mind with
elements of Eurasianism and geopolitical thinking.
Dugin even claimed after his relationship with the
general cooled down that Ivashov had plagiarized
some of his works.
Although Ivashov’s general views and his approach
to Iran did have many similarities to Dugin’s, they
were not identical. Ivashov believed that the Russian
Orthodox civilization was totally different from that
of the West. The point was not geographical position,
as was the case for Dugin, but that the geopolitical
was interwoven with other explanatory models, some
of them rooted in traditional Slavophilism. Thus, in
Ivashov’s view, the point of the difference with the
West is that Russia is a collectivistic and spiritualized
civilization with a deep appreciation of other cultures
and a deep sense of justice. This moved it closer to
other civilizations whose civilizational matrix was
similar to that of Russia. This was the case with most
Asian civilizations, Muslim civilization among them.
Iran emerged here as a natural ally.
Ivashov, who had visited Iran several times in
various capacities, was a staunch supporter of close
ties. This support brought him quite close to Dugin,
but their views were not identical. Ivashov visualized
a Russian/Iranian alliance as a part of an alliance
with other countries, including China. Here, Ivashov
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could, of course, appeal to considerable changes in the
Russian/Chinese relationship. The hostility between
China and Russia was essentially over after Gorbachev’s
trip to China in 1989, and, during Yeltsin’s tenure,
the relationship improved steadily. China became a
major customer for Russian weapons. Dugin’s views
on China were much more guarded. He recognized
China’s importance as a counterbalance to the United
States, and from this perspective China was a potential
ally. But Chinese/Russian rapprochement could be
only temporary; a lasting alliance was excluded due
to the danger of China’s demographic expansion.
Here, of course, Dugin addressed the fear among the
Russian populace and elite, who pictured China as
potentially engulfing the Russian Far East and Siberia
with a flood of émigrés. Iran created no such problem.
Another advantage of Iran was that, whereas China
increasingly viewed Russia as declining, the Iranian
elite saw Russia as an equal or even stronger power.
There were other differences in Ivashev’s and
Dugin’s views as well, mostly related to Western
Europe. Dugin regarded Germany and France in
particular, as potentially solid Eurasian powers that
could be firmly on the side of Russia. He had quite a
positive view on the European “New Right,” with its
often-strong anti-Americanism. He fully supported
their views about Europe spreading from Reykjavik to
Vladivostok, as a unified geopolitical entity directed
against the only true enemy—the United States. Here,
of course, Europe was seen not as a geographical but
as a geopolitical cultural entity. Ivashov had a different
opinion, rooted in his Soviet background: Western
Europe, Germany, and France, part of NATO, were
historical enemies of the USSR/Russia. Yet with all
their differences, Ivashov and Dugin shared a vision
of Iran as a major Russian ally, the principal tool for
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transforming Russia again into a major global power.
One might add here that the Communist views
on the global geopolitical picture were essentially the
same. And one could assume that by the second part of
Yeltsin’s regime, the Communists had been transformed
into corporate Nationalists, and Marxism-Leninism
had almost disappeared from public discourse even
as a fig leaf. Communist views on Iran were quite
similar to those of Dugin’s Eurasianists and Ivashov’s
Imperial Nationalists. Iran seems to have increasingly
loomed large in the minds of not just the opposition,
still entrenched in the army, state, and educational
institutions, but also the mainstream elite, as the most
important ally that would make Russia a great power
that would challenge Pax Americana.
The idea of a mighty alliance of Russia and
Iran had become increasingly popular among the
well-entrenched opposition, or, to be precise, semiopposition—remember that such people as Ivashov
had occupied an important position in the army
and similar institutions—but one should question
the practical implications of a grand scheme. These
implications were quite limited, even on the level of
official ideological discourse. The official Kremlin
message was that Russia was, of course, upset by
NATO’s expansion and demanded that Russia should
be recognized by the West as a great power among
equals, with the right to engage in foreign policies of
great powers. Yet it was emphasized that Russia still
regarded itself as part of the concert of Western powers
and cherished being a good U.S. partner.
The relationship with Iran was presented as a purely
commercial arrangement. Selling weapons to Iran was
presented in the same way as for China, also described
as a purely commercial deal with no direct intention of
transforming China into a counterbalance to the United
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States. In practice, the Russian relationship with Iran
was also rather limited. Russia continued to drag its
feet on the completion of the Bushehr nuclear plant.
Thus, one can see a sharp difference between
ideological discourse and real action. Statements
about Russia’s might, its unique Eurasianism—which
made it possible to create a great alliance—became
quite pronounced, but actual decisions in the direction
of these alliances were lacking. Indeed, the notion of
building a great Russian/Eurasian empire in which
imperial might is a goal in itself was absolutely foreign
to the mentality of the Russian nouveau riches. They
could use the imperial lexicon in public parlance, but
in their real activities they were driven exclusively
by economic interests. These interests were deeply
connected with the West. It was the West where they
transferred their capital, buying real estate and making
other investments. They regarded the West as a refuge
in case the situation in Russia went awry—and the
chance of a Communist revanche was not discarded
until the very end of Yeltsin’s tenure. One could state
that the possibility of Communists taking power
was not groundless after the default of the financial
institutions in 1998 that led to the sharp devaluation
of the ruble. Furthermore, neither financial tycoons
nor Yeltsin’s close circle, known as “family,” saw
NATO expansion toward the Russian border as a real
plan to attack Russia, despite the endless warning of
Nationalists and, of course, Communists about such a
threat. The upper echelon of the elite were afraid not
of an unexpected attack from the West but of a threat
of quite a different nature. They were afraid that there
might be some unexpected outburst from below,
similar to the events of 1993, which they would not be
able to quell. And for this reason, they continued to
look at the West as a safe haven in case of calamity.
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The West was the place where they could move and
where they had already made preparations for a safe,
comfortable landing—accounts in foreign banks, real
estate, and similar undertakings. For this reason, they
never totally embraced, at least publicly, Nationalist/
imperial philosophy, including that idea of a Russian/
Iranian axis. Even less could this move be traced in real
politics.
THE NATO/SERBIAN WAR AND THE
FOUNDATION FOR PUTIN’S EARLY
GEOPOLITICAL POSTURE
The NATO/Serbian War led to an abrupt change
in the elite view in 1999. This event would play a
considerable role in the Russian elite’s thinking and
various geopolitical gestures, including the approach
to Iran.
As noted earlier, the Nationalist/Communist
opposition to Yeltsin’s regime and his generally proWestern policies repeated endlessly that the West was
still deeply hostile, and that the friendly smiles and
handshakes of Western leaders were the deceptive
cover of predators. This statement was ejected by
the Yeltsin elite as essentially nonsense, despite its
increasing unease with the expanding NATO. NATO’s
attack against Serbia, which most Russians, regardless
of political affiliation, saw as a friendly Orthodox
Slavic country, was a big shock, even for pro-Western
liberals.
At this point, the idea that the West could,
indeed, strike Russia became not just an assertion of
opposition or semi-opposition but one held by at least
a considerable part of the mainstream. A clear sign of
the sharp decline of Western/Russian trust was the
dramatic action of Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov,
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who turned his plane around in midair enroute to
the United States to negotiate a loan. A dramatic
reorientation of Russian foreign policy was apparently
discussed at the very top, and the Asiatic direction was
seen as quite visible. Indeed, Primakov entertained the
idea of a broad geopolitical axis that would include
Russia, China, and India, and that was regarded by
some Russian pundits as a sort of crypto-Eurasianist
axis. While Iran was not named as a potential part
of the axis, it was implicitly present. Primakov was
trained as a Middle East specialist and would have a
professional interest in the Arabs and Iranians. The
ideas of Eurasianism and Imperial Nationalism of the
Ivashov type seemed to be the ideological foundation
of the regime after Putin’s assent to the presidency in
2000.
THE BEGINNING OF PUTIN’S TENURE AND
THE PICK OF THE DREAMS OF AN IRANIAN/
RUSSIAN AXIS
From the very beginning of his tenure, Putin
proclaimed that building a strong state and restoring
Russia’s worldwide standing were his major priorities.
He quickly consolidated his power by increasing
Moscow’s control over the provincial governors, who
had often behaved as almost independent rulers by
the end of Yeltsin’s regime. He also clipped the wings
of some financial tycoons, putting some in prison
and driving others to emigrate; this dramatically
increased his power over the remaining moguls
who had amassed enormous wealth through shady
deeds and had considerable political clout during
Yeltsin’s presidency. Putin’s foreign policy initiative
was also conspicuously Asian-oriented and aimed to
demonstrate that Russia again was a major power. For
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the first time since the late Soviet era, power was seen,
or at least projected to the public, as a goal in itself, not
just a way of getting this or that material benefit. The
Eastern direction acquired new importance and was
portrayed to the global community and the Russian
public as an attempt to restore Russia’s position as
a great power, not just to get economic benefits and
leverage in dealing with the West.
One of the manifestations of this “turn to the East”
was Putin’s 2000 visit to China where he signed a
treaty that appeared to some Western observers as
almost a military alliance. Putin also made trips to
North Korea and Cuba in 2000, all three countries
sworn enemies of the United States. In this new,
apparently solidly Eurasian policy, Iran appeared as
an important building block. The most dramatic action
was scrapping the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement and
full resumption of the sale of sophisticated weapons
to Tehran. The prospect delighted the Iranians, whose
delegation to Russia proposed much closer ties and
the transformation of Iran into a major customer for
Russia’s military hardware. One could assume that they
were not alone in welcoming Putin’s anti-American,
implicitly Eurasian posture.
North Korea and China were both glad to play the
Russian card at a time when the U.S.-China relationship
demonstrated considerable tension. Indeed, at that
time, a U.S. reconnaissance plane was forced to land
in China; and considerable effort by Washington
was needed to gain its release. A clear Eurasian/
National Imperial geopolitical posture—with Iran
and other Asian nations as essential elements of the
design—seemed to confirm the regime’s benevolence
to ideologists and groups that were still in the shadow
of the past or out of favor.
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Yevgeny Primakov, the crypto-Eurasianist with
the grand plan for an Asian axis and sacked as Prime
Minister at the end of the Yeltsin era, had been returned
to the top of the political Olympus as a geopolitical guru.
While some of the “Red to Brown” were disappointed
that Gennadi Zyuganov had not become president,
Aleksandr Prokhanov, editor of Zavtra, was fairly
pleased with Putin. Originally, he saw little difference
between Putin’s geopolitical designs—forging a
Russian/Iranian axis seemed to be an important
element––and those of the Communists. Prokhanov
was much disappointed with the Communists, who did
not dare face Yeltsin openly. The love affair between
Prokhanov and Putin had been strengthened when
Prokhanov was invited to the Kremlin for conversation
with a new Russian leader who, Prokhanov believed,
would make a decisive step toward returning Russia
to its former greatness. Imperial Nationalists with
their Eurasianist proclivities and views, not much
different from those of the majority of Nationalists,
were also originally heartened. Ivashov was surely
among those originally optimistic in regard to Putin,
for he undoubtedly believed that Putin, ex-KGB
member, would move in the direction of transforming
Russia into a great imperial Eurasian power.58 If no
such push were done, Russia would fall apart, with
borders possibly reduced to those in the 15th and 16th
centuries.59
Most important for the Russian elite’s approach to
Iran was Dugin’s position, for he was the most ardent
advocate of a Russia/Iran permanent geopolitical
marriage. Dugin was extremely excited by Putin’s rise
to power, and his vision of the post-Yeltsin era was
certainly shared by others. It was a craving not just for
strong power that would end the criminalized anarchy
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that had created problems for all Russian society—elite
and masses alike—but for bloody vengeance. These
feelings were especially popular among the masses,
most of whom regarded post-Soviet development as a
sheer disaster that made it possible for a few nouveaux
riche to amass enormous fortunes but drove the
majority to misery. This sense of social injustice was
deeply interwoven with the sense of the collapse of the
USSR—the mighty Eurasian state. This nostalgia was
shared not only by the “Red to Brown” folk, as at the
beginning of the Yeltsin era, but by a much broader
segment of the population. People wished for a sort
of a bloody catharsis of rejuvenation, which would
lead not only to the restoration of social justice, but
also to the restoration of the Russian state to that of its
legitimate place in the new world order.
Dugin fully supported this view of the emerging
Putin regime and prophesied that Putin would soon
engage in a gothic type of repression against those
responsible for the destruction of the USSR. This
transformation would lead to a web of Eurasian
alliances, with the Russia-Iran axis one of the most
important parts. Dugin believed he was the one who
would provide the regime with intellectual guidance,
and it seemed his dreams were about to materialize.
The regime sent him encouraging signals. He continued
to advise Gennady Seleznev, “the speaker of the State
Duma from 1996 to 2003,” and became “chairman
of the Geopolitical Expertise Section of the Duma’s
consultative National Security Council. His Center for
Geopolitical Expertise and his lectures at the Military
Academy of General Staff has earned him financial
support from military circles.”60
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Dugin had quickly transformed his Eurasian
movement into a party. This could not be done without
at least indirect encouragement from above. The
Congress and party organization required considerable
funds and presumably the blessing of a friend in the
Kremlin; most likely, direct financial support made
it possible to engage in the venture. The change in
Dugin’s fortune could be seen even in the appearance
of his office. When the author of this piece saw him
in the 1990s, Dugin had an office in a small room in
the building of one of the small Moscow libraries.
At the beginning of Putin’s tenure, I met Dugin in a
spacious office with Putin’s portrait on the wall. Dugin
also continued to publish prolifically.61 He believed his
hour had come and that he, possibly with other similar
intellectuals, would be the major ideologist of the
regime. This position seems to have been ensured by
Putin’s visible attachment to Eurasianist ideology, for
example, his praise of Gumilev as “the great Eurasianist
of our time.”62 Quite a few other observers shared this
view.
Yet even at that time the major modus operandi of the
regime was beginning to reveal itself, demonstrating
that while the ideological entourage of Putin’s
regime looked different from Yeltsin’s, the practical
implications revealed much consistency. The imperial
East-oriented ideology and some appropriate actions
were combined with quite different postulates and
deeds. First and most important, ideological toughness
and imperial language were not always translated into
practice. Second, even the ideological stance was not
always consistent, including that related to Iran.63 To
start with, while engaging in arms sales to Iran, Putin
refrained from selling anything that could be used to
make Iran nuclear and made it clear that Russia would
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not engage in a military confrontation with the United
States. Moreover, Russia’s imperial posture and turn
to the East coincided with an equally vigorous turn
to the West, particularly the United States. After the
September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, Putin was the first
world leader to offer help to President George Bush,
and fully acquiesced to American bases in Central
Asia.
The Western direction continued even after the
American invasion of Iraq and promulgation of the
“neocon” doctrine that justified striking wherever the
United States found it necessary to fight terrorism, or,
to be precise, to defend its national interests. The strike
was almost as unsettling as the Yugoslavia/Serbia
war 4 years earlier. Yet at least at the beginning, it
pushed Russia closer not to Asia, but to Germany and
France. The appeal to these countries seemed not to
derail Eurasian geopolitical designs. Indeed, for quite
a few post-Soviet Eurasianists, or neo-Eurasianists,
France and Germany were part of Eurasia. Dugin, for
example, assumed that an alliance with France and
Germany could well reinforce a Russian-Iranian axis.
Still, a decisive turn to Europe was not reinforced by a
decisive turn to Iran.
The Russian turn to Europe indicated that its
Iranian/Asian-oriented foreign policy was not consistent even at the beginning of Putin’s tenure, when
Eurasianists/Imperial Nationalists apparently had
a strong influence in the Kremlin and were able to
translate some imperial paradigms into practice. Even
less did the idea of consistently embracing Iran in a true
geopolitical marriage, not for fleeting and pragmatic
interests, became popular.
Before moving to the second part of this monograph,
which covers the later stages in making the Russian/
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Iranian relationship, some conclusions should be
made. The Russian approach to Iran, especially in the
late Soviet/early post-Soviet era, was firmly imbedded
in Eurasianism and similar doctrines. Historical
Eurasianism paid little attention to Iran; it was basically
the philosophy of a self-centered Russian civilization
shaped in the tsarist and Soviet periods. The later
modification sees Iran as crucially important. This
form of Eurasianism blended with similar doctrines to
see greatness as an essential aspect of Russian destiny
and Iran as an essential part of the web of alliances that
could make Russia a grand empire once again, not as a
means to get this or that benefit but as a goal in itself.
Iran was a true ally Russia should support, regardless
of cost, in the same way the USSR had treated its allies
during the Cold War era when it forsook material gains
and was ready to risk a major war with the United
States. Alliance with Iran did not exclude alliances with
other powers, for example, West and Central European
states, but the gravitation toward Iran implied that
Russia still sees itself as more an Asian than a Western
power.
Note that at that period, despite imperial, antiWestern, and especially anti-American rhetoric,
Eurasianism/Imperial Nationalism had never dominated the Russian elite’s ideological discourse and rarely
led to practical action. But this paradigm has been
on the rise since the late Gorbachev era and, though
facing the competition of another approach to Iran—
to be discussed further—it will not disappear. As an
important ideological layer, it exists in the minds of
the Russian elite, but it will be challenged and shaped
by other ideological trends. A major trend, increasing
suspicion and pragmatic opportunism toward Iran,
was quite opposite to imperial self-abnegation for an
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ally’s interests. There are many reasons for this more
pragmatic approach. However, in our view, the major
one was not so much external as internal, the increasing
tension of historically Orthodox ethnic Russians and
Russian Muslims of various ethnic origins.
MUSLIM CHALLENGE
The Imperial Nationalistic and Eurasian model
regarded Iran as Russia’s foremost ally and assumed
that Iran’s allies would be necessarily Russia’s allies.
The major threat would come from the West, mostly
the United States. This threat aimed to conquer Russia
the same way as had been done over the centuries
from the Mongols to Hitler. Russia’s alliance with Iran
and similar friendly, mostly Asian, powers would
prevent this from happening. Iran was seen not as just
essentially similar by culture and tradition to Russia—
the Yeltsin regime was not seen as an affirmation of
the country’s real nature and destiny and would be
replaced in the near future—but also as an advanced
state.
Those who saw Iran as a backward nation—a
symbiosis of the worst of Soviet totalitarianism and
the Middle Ages—proclaimed that Iran had nothing
to do with Russia. In this interpretation, Russia is
seen as a Western country and the Soviet period as
an aberration. Even those who saw totalitarianism as
deeply rooted in the country’s history assumed that
this tradition could be overcome, and Russia could
reinvent a new political and cultural trend and join
the West. This was the view of Russian Westernized
liberals in the late Gorbachev/early Yeltsin era. But
their influence declined steadily at the end of Yeltsin’s
tenure and the beginning of Putin’s. The pro-Iranian
view appeared to have become more and more
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popular among the Russian elite. Yet by around the
middle of Putin’s presidency, a new trend challenged
Eurasianist and Nationalist Imperialist views on Iran.
It was caused by the rise of tensions between Russians
and Muslims of various ethnic backgrounds and the
corresponding crumbling of the notion of Eurasian
“symbiosis” between Orthodox Slavs and traditionally
oriented Muslims both inside and outside Russia.
The problems of Russian Muslims and the Muslim world in general were not in the forefront of either
conservative Eurasianists or Imperial Russian Nationalists in the beginning of the post-Soviet era. For Russian liberals, Russian Muslims and the Muslim world
were the backyard of the global community dominated
by the West and led by the United States. Eurasianists
and Imperial Nationalists, while regarding Muslims as
brothers of ethnic Russians, usually relegated them to
the role of “younger brothers.” Ethnic Russians were
the leaders. The Muslim parties in the last years of the
Soviet era and the beginning of the post-Soviet era
were minuscule in their influence, and even the most
influential and lucky ones could, at best, get a few seats
in the state Duma.64 But problems with the Muslim
community started to emerge, first from the Northern
Caucasus.
The war in Chechnya, later spreading to other
regions of the Caucasus, was originally seen by
Eurasianists and Imperial Nationalists as a product of
the West, mostly the United States,65 which, by using
the proxies Turkey and Saudi Arabia, created trouble
for Russia. Putin came into power after the spectacular
1999 apartment building explosion in Moscow, where
several hundred people died instantly. The real cause of
this terrorist attack is still unknown, and some observers
believed that it was actually organized by the Federal
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Security Service (FSB)—the Russian secret police,
successors to the Komitet Gosudarstvenoi Bezopasnosti
(KGB). But events were presented to the Russian public
as the handiwork of Chechen separatists who blatantly
violated the Kasavyurt Agreement signed by General
Alexander Lebed in 1996.
The response, the beginning of the Second Chechen
War, provided Putin, at that time just blessed by
Yeltsin as president, an essential image of a tough
man who protected Russians and Russia. This image
was interwoven with Putin’s image as someone
who not only protected the average Russian but also
understood the populace’s needs. Putin’s statement
that he would “Bump off (mochit’) terrorists even in
the toilets” became famous. The fact that Putin used
the world “mochit,”—literally, “make wet,” the lexicon
of the criminal underworld—increased his popularity.
In the growing criminalization of post-Soviet Russia,
a criminal lexicon permeated all segments of society,
and using criminal argot indicated to simple folk that
Putin was the same as they were and could be trusted.
And, of course, this projection as the protector of the
populace was interwoven with other aspects of Putin’s
early promise to return Russia to the position of a great
power, to “lift from her knees.” The attack against the
Chechen resistance was implicitly connected with
anti-Western rhetoric, for the Chechens were seen as
U.S. agents and proxies. The beginning of the Second
Chechen War was quite successful for Putin. After
much fighting and relentless bombing of Groznyi,
the Chechen capital, the insurgents were driven to
the mountains. However, as time progressed, the
North Caucasian resistance increased the ferocity
of its attacks—the beginning of Putin’s presidency
was marked by two spectacular attacks in Nord-Ost
(Moscow, 2002) and Beslan (2004).
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The jihadization of the movement also increased.
Some anti-American pundits still attempted to connect
the jihadists with the United States. Dugin claimed
that the jihadists were the product of the American
“Atlantic” civilization, and that they were quite similar.
Both jihadists and Americans wanted to homogenize
the entire world and had no respect for cultural
diversity. But it became increasingly clear that the fact
that jihadists were Russia’s enemy did not make them
U.S. friends. Moreover, by 2007 the North Caucasian
resistance had finally transformed itself into an alQaida type organization—hostile to both Russia and
United States—and marginalized the more moderate
Nationalists led by Akhmed Zakaev.
The North Caucasians were hardly the only
emerging problem. Other members of the Russian
Muslim community demanded redistribution of power
and wealth for their benefit, and increasing numbers
of Russian Muslims—this is a major differences from
previous eras—had no intention of assimilating.
Indeed, when Dugin created his own Eurasian party, a
similar party was launched by Abdal Wahed Niiazov,
a Muslim, and according to some rumors a Russian
convert, whose real name was Vadim Medvedev.66
Niiazov’s Eurasianists supported Eurasian “symbiosis,”
but proclaimed that Russian Muslims should be the
equal, not just “Younger Brothers,” of Russians.
This stress on the paramount role of Muslims of
various ethnic origins, with personal dislike, led to
bitter confrontations.67 In 2005, some influential Muslim
clergy proclaimed that the Russian coat of arms, which
represented St. George slaying the dragon, should
be removed because it is a purely Christian symbol
that could be offensive to Russian Muslims, and that
religion and state should be officially separate in Russia.
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A Russian observer, however, noted that the concern
over St. George had to do not with Christianity but
with the redistribution of power in Russia. This claim
was rejected with disgust.
The crumbling of the idea of Eurasian “symbiosis”
that relegates Russian Muslims to the position of
“younger brothers” could be further demonstrated by
Dugin’s fate. He continued to be a prolific writer and
fashionable intellectual, but his position as policymaker
who played a significant role in shaping the country’s
agenda collapsed. He not only was unable to get a
Duma seat but was actually expelled from his own
party. The party itself was transformed to the Party of
“Eurasian Union” (Partiia “Evraziiskii Soiuz”).68
The new sans-Dugin Eurasianists were led by Petr
Suslov, an ex-intelligence officer. (The “Eurasian Union”
party has not existed for a long time and seems to have
disappeared without a trace.) Niiazov Eurasianists,
who emphasized “symbiosis” on more favorable
terms for Muslims, did not fare much better. To have
broader appeal, the Niiazov Eurasianist Party was
integrated in a form of electoral alliance with a broader
block: the Great Russia-Eurasian Union (Velikaia
Rossiia-Evraziiskii Souiz).69 But the party faded from
sight, and Niiazov became marginalized in political/
quasi-political play. All this indicates that not only are
increasing numbers of ethnic Russians not attracted
to any variation of “symbiosis,” a sort of trans-ethnic
identity of power-sharing with Muslims of various
ethnic origins, but Russian Muslims are increasingly
skeptical in regard to still dominant ethnic Russians.
Various modifications of Eurasianism are increasingly
replaced by constructions where Russians have no
place in an ideology resting on ethnic nationalism or
universalistic Islamism.
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The most essential aspect of the ideology of
increasingly assertive Russian Muslims, at least for our
study, is their generally positive view of Iran. The views
of Geidar Dzhemal, a prominent Muslim ideologist
in Russia and Chairman of the Islamic Committee of
Russia, could serve as an example. Dzhemal was an
ethnic Azerbaijanian who started his intellectual career
as a close associate of Dugin. Both were intellectually
shaped by the semi-underground Bohemian circle of the
extravagant writer Yuri Mamleev, fond of descriptions
of the most bizarre forms of sex and violence, “who
emigrated to the United States in 1974.”70 Dugin also
noted that Dzhemal, the older, had been an intellectual
mentor to him. Like Dugin, Dzhemal originally believed
in Russian/Muslim “symbiosis” and was strongly
against Yeltsin. He thought the regime had perverted
Russia’s true Eurasian nature and transformed the
country into a powerless U.S. appendage, and he
put his trust in the “Red to Brown” opposition. Yet
as time progressed, Dzhemal’s views increasingly
differed from Dugin’s. He began to reject the Eurasian
paradigm in which historically Orthodox Russians
either explicitly or implicitly retain the role of “older
brothers” to Muslims in geopolitical arrangements.
For Dzhemal, Ethnic Russians and Russian Muslims
should be equal in the new, post-Soviet Russia, and
Russian-European ties (still important for Dugin,
despite his fascination with Iran and similar Muslim
states) should be minimal or nonexistent.
As time progressed, their views became even more
opposed. Dugin, if he did not become part of the
establishment, at least rendered absolute support to the
regime, while Dzhemal continued to be in opposition
to the Kremlin. With time, his opposition hardened.
Not only was the current regime a U.S. stooge and the
enemy of both Russian Muslims and Muslims all over
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the world, but originally Russia was not a friend of
Muslims. The view that the regime was a perversion of
the country’s real essence should be discarded. Russia
had been an oppressive state toward all minorities,
especially Muslims, from the start of its history. The
early years of the Soviet regime were possibly the only
exception.
Therefore, since Russians could create a new order
in which all ethnic/religious groups could live in peace
and a just society, Muslims should do it themselves. In
this arrangement, any dream of a Orthodox Russian
and Russian Muslim union became a pipedream. The
fact that Russians and Muslims happen to live in the
same space does not make them related in any other
way. Russian Muslims’ real brothers are not Russians
but the global Muslim umma. Russia’s Muslims are a
part of the global Muslim community and should retain
the revolutionary vigor that could liberate itself and
all of humanity. The image of the Muslim community
as a new collective revolutionary force, so to speak,
resembles the image of the revolutionary proletariat,
at least as it was visualized by Marx.
In his replacement of the revolutionary proletariat by
the revolutionary Muslims, Dzhemal was quite similar
to the European Left, who, while disappointed in the
revolutionary potential of the European proletariat, in
the 1960s put their hope in the revolutionary potential
of criminals, racial minorities, and similar groups. For
Dzhemal, the radical Muslims had emerged as the
potential saviors of humanity against the evil alliance
of the United States, Russia, and Israel—all bound to
suppress Muslims and the downtrodden in general.
In this universal struggle between Muslims and their
oppressors, Iran played an important role.
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It is true that Dzhemal’s view on Iran was not
consistent. At the beginning of his intellectual career in
post-Soviet Russia and possibly earlier, Dzhemal had
a rather bleak view of Iran. He viewed the evolution
of the Iranian regime pretty much like that of the
Soviet regime. The Iranian Revolution had originally
represented the hope of humanity, but repressive
bureaucraticization of the regime took place in the
same way as in the USSR. Still, as time progressed,
Dzhema’s view of Iran became brighter,71 especially
after Ahmenidjad took power. His ascendance meant
a return of the early revolutionary vigor that had made
Iran one of the leading forces fighting the unholy alliance
of the United States, Israel and, implicitly, Russia as a
part of an unholy cabal of Muslim oppressors.
Dzhemal’s increasing contact with Iranians—he
visited the country at least once72—made him even
more predisposed to the regime, which he clearly saw as
not following the usual revolutionary transformation/
degeneration. Russia/USSR had been one of the best
examples where the original drive for worldwide
liberation of the oppressed had degenerated into a
sort of “National-Bolshevik” transmogrification and
the revolutionary slogans just a fig leaf of indigenous
long-seated nationalism. The Iranian interpretation,
Dzhemal implied, escaped this pitfall, and the Iranian
flirtation with Islamists—so perplexing and regretted
by Dugin—is not a liability but a confirmation that
the Tehran regime is still a revolutionary force, not
just a disguised manifestation of primordial Persian
nationalism. Iran should therefore get whatever it
needed to fight off the Americans and promote the
revolutionary process.
Either Dzhemal or those affiliated with him,
for example, those who published on Internet sites
sponsored by him, proclaimed that Iran should get
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nuclear weapons from no one but Russia, for this
would be in Russia’s best interests. Other observers
(from Internet sites) believe that Iran actually needs no
one’s help: it already has nuclear weapons. But the most
important weapons of the Iranians are high spirits and
readiness to sacrifice for the common good. Precisely
this is absent among Americans, these observers
implied. If the United States, in its imperial delusions
and belief in its omnipotence, were to attack Iran, it
would be not a victorious blitzkrieg but a generationlong war resulting in a crushing American defeat. The
power of Iran and the disastrous consequences for
the United States of a war with Iran are understood
even by realistic-minded American politicians such
as the “Polish count.” This, of course, was an oblique
reference to Brezshinski, regarded by quite a few
Russian pundits (e.g., Dugin) as the most influential
person in Washington in regard to foreign policy. His
tensions with the Bush administration were blissfully
ignored.73
This praise of Iran as a mighty revolutionary force
went along with sometimes explicit praise of the
Chechen resistance, whose revolutionary activities
should lead to the destruction of the Russian state and
transform the Russian/Eurasian space of the former
USSR in an anarchical/revolutionary mix of radical
Muslims who would launch a worldwide jihad-type
revolution. Dzhemal’s view here was quite similar
to that entertained by the jihadist members of the
Chechen resistance and some al-Qaida ideologists such
as Zarkawi.
Dzhemal was a popular figure among some Russian
radicals and known abroad. He visited several Muslim
countries including, as noted, Iran, as an honorable
guru. One could argue that Dzhemal’s views were on
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the fringe of legality and could be marginalized. But
similar views—in less radical form—could be recorded
in the statements of Russian Muslims who were part of
the establishment. Many of them, while praising Iran,
implicitly juxtaposed it to Russia. This was the case
with Duma Shamil Sultanov.
As until recently a member of of the Russian
parliament, Sultanov could not subscribe to Dzemaltype radical views. At the same time, similar to Dzemal,
he was a staunch supporter of the alliance with Iran. He
stated that Russia and Iran should be allies, Iran should
play the leading role in the geopolitical/strategic
arrangement. Present-day Russia had degenerated and
followed the disastrous path of the West, which led not
just to economic decline and social polarization but
also, and this was most important in Sultanov’s view,
to spiritual decay. Living for high goals and the spirit
of sacrifice more or less disappeared, and this made
it harder for Russia to stand against Western, mostly
American, pressure.
For Sultanov, the story is quite different with
Iran. He visited Iran, possibly several times, and was
impressed with the country. What most profoundly
affected him was not the economic or military prowess
of the regime but the feeling of sacrifice and dedication
to a high goal that permeated Iranian society.74 He was
especially impressed by his visit to one of the major
cemeteries in the capital, a place of almost half a million
dead martyrs or revolutionaries. He saw it as a place
of a sort of holy pilgrimage and reverence. This, he
thought, was an indication that an entire nation could
dedicate itself to a higher goal and even forsake lives
for this. It was this spiritual wholesomeness that made
Iran the leader and an example for Russia.
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Only acceptance of Iran not just as Russia’s equal but
as the leader in the Russia/Iran alliance would make it
possible for Russia to restore its international position.75
Yet, rapprochement with Iran would come with a
price. Russia must change itself a lot before actually
being able to cooperate with Iran in a meaningful way,
not out of a purely pragmatic cash nexus. This could
not be accomplished without a considerably increased
role of Islam in Russia. Without Islam, the entire global
community would go astray.
Sultanov’s explicit juxtaposition of the rise of Iran
as a part of the rising Muslim world to Russia also was
directly related, at least in the eyes of ethnic Russian
observers, with his own ethnicity. That unrestricted
praise of Iran started to come mostly from nonethnic
Russians; people who were historically Muslim could
also be seen with Radzhab Safarov, who led the
Center for the Study of Contemporary Iran. Safarov
was less critical than Sultanov toward the present
Russian regime. He could allow the remark that by not
fully engaging with Iran, Russia had made a serious
geopolitical mistake and lost a valuable customer.76
Still, he is an ethnic Tajik, and can be seen by the Russian
public as a Muslim who advocated the importance of
the Muslim state and of ethnic kin—Tajiks are close to
Iranians.
Connecting praise of Iran—even in a moderate,
Russia-friendly way—not just with the U.S./West
struggle but with criticism of Russia—began to bother
the Russian elite, possibly on a collective subconscious
level. Iran emerged not just as a friendly or at least
neutral power, but as a power whose rise could
be related to the much unwelcome rise of Russian
Muslims, who demand the redistribution of power,
and that rise of Muslim influence could provide a
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breeding ground for terrorist activities. This trend in
the perception of Iran coincided with the rise of a new
type of nationalism. It is profoundly anti-Imperial and
anti-Muslim, and its views of Iran, while not consistent,
were mostly negative, or at least skeptical.
THE NEW RUSSIAN NATIONALISM AND THE
NEW VISION OF MUSLIMS: IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE IRANIAN IMAGE
As noted earlier, the various forms of Russian
nationalism that emerged in the late Soviet and early
post-Soviet era were profoundly imperial. Their
representatives asserted that, at a minimum, Russia’s
lost Soviet provinces should be reunited with Russia in
some form. Some believed that the Russian/Eurasian
Empire should expand beyond the borders of the
former USSR through conquest or, more likely, a web
of alliances. Only Muslims of various ethnic origins are
Russia’s natural allies, plainly because Russia’s cultural
and political matrixes, shaped through the centuries,
were essentially similar to those of traditional Muslim
societies such as Iran. The pro-Western, pro-American
Yeltsin regime was an aberration that would be
removed in the near future. These Russian NationalistImperialists believed not only that Russians and
Muslims of various ethnic origins—inside and outside
the former USSR—would be natural allies, but that
Russians would maintain the leading role in these
alliances. They believed the Muslims would willingly
accept the leadership of ethnic Russians, so there was
a reason for their usually benign views on Iran. But
by the middle of Putin’s presidency, a new Russian
nationalism started to emerge, with idiosyncratic views
of the Muslim world and of Iran as a part of it.
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Russian nationalism in the post-Soviet era was
in a way a new phenomenon, and one could argue
that nationalism was born in Russia only then. One,
of course, could state that this claim is not true, that
nationalism is an ideology that has existed in Russia
for centuries. Still, we must remember that in the 18th
and most of the 19th centuries, nationalism was mostly
an intellectual construction of a narrow segment of the
Russian elite. Even in the early 20th century at the
end of tsarist Russia, most Russians—the peasants—
were in general completely oblivious to the notion of
a nation as an entity separate from the personality of
the autocrats. Their sense of Russianness was usually
related to language and Orthodoxy.
Russian peasants, of course, were not unique, and
a similar form of identity could be found in other
pre-modern societies. Even in the Soviet era, despite
nationalism’s prominence in official discourse since
the late 1920s and early 1930s, most average Russians’
identity came not from the nation but from the state,
and Russianness mostly dissolved into Sovietness.
This weakness of Russian nationalism among
average Russians explains why, despite the lamentation
of intellectuals who regarded the end of the USSR as the
greatest catastrophe in Russian history, most Russians
accepted the collapse without much resistance. In fact,
many of them regarded the empire as a liability and
expected improvement in their living standard after
shedding it, not just in Eastern Europe but even in the
republics of the former USSR. This absence of deeprooted Russian nationalism is quite understandable if
we remember that nationalism is the product of modern
capitalism and the emergence of law as a force that
transcends the web of personal connections and blood
ties that was the operational model for the majority of
Russians, in both the tsarist and Soviet eras.
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Only recently has modern capitalism slowly begun
to entrench itself in Russia, now mostly an urban society.
Private property is affecting the life of the average
Russian as never before, despite the deformation of
Russian capitalism by corruption and purely criminal
aspects. With the advent of capitalism, nationalism
started to percolate from an ideological construction of
the elite to the mind of the average Russian.
Understanding the complexity of emerging
Russian nationalism is useful to view Russia’s image
of Iran in a more general vision of the Muslim world.
Some modifications of Russian nationalism did not
break completely with Eurasian/Imperial Nationalist
ideologies. Members of these branches would not
mind seeing Russia as a great power, but they were
not obsessed with imperial might as a goal to which
everything should be subordinated. A high standard
of living, economic prosperity in general, was, in their
view, much more important than the imperial greatness
so fascinating to Eurasianists and National Imperialists.
They were not mesmerized by the West, especially the
United States—a viewpoint so characteristic to the late
Soviet/early post-Soviet era. At the same time, they
did not share the Duginian/Huntingtonian notion
about the inevitable conflict between Russia and the
United States. They saw the conflict between Russia
and the West as a pragmatic realpolitik-type struggle.
And, while fully understanding that competition is an
essential element of the Social Darwinist world, they
blame the United States not so much for defending its
turf as for its irrational and ideologized foreign policy.
Indeed for some of them, like Gleb Pavlovsky—one of
the leading current ideologists—the “neocons” behave
exactly like the USSR of the past.
In this interpretation, the Soviet leaders were not
pragmatic politicians but ideologues who believed
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what they preached and took the idea of the spread of
socialism all over the world close to heart. They arranged
the entire foreign policy according to this unworkable
paradigm and paid dearly for it. For Pavlovsky and
others like him, Bush’s “neocons” followed the same
road at the same peril. But if reasonable pragmatists
would stay at the helm of American foreign policy,
Russia would be able to find common ground with
them. Russia, despite its problems with the West, still
ultimately belongs to Western Christian civilization; in
any case, the West—mostly Western Europe—is closer
to Russia than is any other civilization. The Soviet
period is seen as an aberration, at least as an event that
has passed into history with no chance of return.
The Soviet period emerged in several somewhat
contradictory facets. On one hand, the strengths and
achievements of the USSR were acknowledged, and
its political/social and economic achievements were
praised. On the other hand, the same USSR—a strong
totalitarian power—evoked not only fear but also
disgust.
The new Russian Nationalists’ approach to the
Muslim world—where Iran is placed—had specific
features. These groups would not mind using Iran
like any other country for their own purposes, such
as a counterbalance to the United States or in various
commercial deals. But they had never entertained
the feeling that Iran is kindred to Russia, a basically
European/Christian civilization, or thought about
strong military ties with it. They had little desire for a
permanent geopolitical marriage, with mutual devotion
and mutual sacrifice, which was at the heart of the
Eurasianist vision of a Russian/Iranian relationship.
Pragmatically skeptical in their vision of Iran, they
assumed Iran viewed Russia in the same way.
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This guarded view was part of the Russian
Nationalists’ view of Muslims, and in fact of all
minorities inside Russia. These minorities could live in
peace in the shade of the Russian eagle. Russians would
treat them fairly and, having no rigid racist prejudices,
would admit some thoroughly Russified Muslims to
their midst. But they rejected any idea of a Eurasian
“symbiosis” and asserted that Russia is a country of
ethnic Russian and Orthodox religion and culture.
This sort of Russian nationalism represented the view
of the growing Russian middle class, who, at least until
the 2008-09 economic crisis, had an increasing sense of
confidence.
Another popular nationalist trend represented
the views of other groups of ethnic Russians. The
development of capitalism under Putin led to increasing
polarization of Russian society, social but also regional
and spatial, where the residents of the Russian capital,
and the big cities in general, lived much better than
those in the provinces.
There are other important social characteristics of
these groups, including growing numbers of young
Russians. And while at the beginning of Gorbachev’s
reforms young Russians were predominately on
the side of the capitalist transformation of society,
increasing numbers of these disenfranchised youth
now see the present economic and social arrangements
as giving them no chance for the future. These
Russians—contrary to the confident members of the
Russian middle class—are not sure that ethnic Russians
can master the increasing numbers of Muslims. They
see the Muslims as not just growing in numbers but
unwilling to assimilate; many openly express disdain
for ethnic Russians and their culture. The young
Russians also see Muslims dominating the markets
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and as a major source of crime. Their bitterness has
instilled them with racist and openly fascist feelings/
ideology. Though not believing that Muslims and
ethnic Russians could live in peace, they do not opt for
imperial expansion taking over Muslim land. Similar to
European neo-Nazis, these Russian minorities opt for
isolation/parochialism. Their desire, if not to purge all
Muslims (in fact, anyone who does not look European)
from Russia, is at least to minimize their presence.
Moreover, quite a few of these people wish to shed the
enclaves where Russians do not dominate completely.
Some even see Moscow as an imperial capital that
fattens itself at the expense of the rest of the country.
In their views, Moscow is a non-Russian city not just
by its policies, but also by its ethnic composition—nonRussian, nonwhite people. Consequently, they regard
the entire Russian state in its present form as hostile to
them and wish its disintegration. Their ideal is a much
smaller but ethnically homogeneous Russian republic
where the principle “Russia for Russians” would
finally be implemented. Such people do not think
much about Iran. But Iran is a Muslim country, and
to these Russians the Iranians, swarthy in appearance,
resemble people from Central Asia and the Caucasus,
whom they hate—irrespective of their ethnic/cultural/
religious affiliation.
Thus, emerging trends among both Russian
Muslims and Russian Nationalists have affected the
perception of Iran by the upper Russian elite. The trends
suggest that the rise of Muslims—inside and outside
Russia—does not necessarily benefit Russia. In the
strong Muslim states or the foreign jihadist movement,
it might create more problems than benefits.
New trends do not mean that layers of previous
ideologies and their views of Iran have completely
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disappeared. Eurasianism and Imperial Russian
Nationalism continue to be part of the ideological
menu of the upper circle of the ruling elite. These
are manifested in the notion that Russia’s citizens
are “Rossiane.” The word implies not just formal
citizenship but a sort of “Eurasian” cultural/quasiethnic symbiosis of ethnic groups of the Russian
Federation. The authorities continue to underscore
the notion of Russia as a grand power that—due to
its unique civilizational position—could draw others,
both West and East. Russia could well turn strongly
to the East if the West, the United States or Europe or
both, does not take Russian interests into account.
The existence of Eurasian and National Imperialist
ideologies is evidenced by the fact that people such
as Dugin and Ivashov have continued to publish
in mainstream Russian venues such as Izvestiia and
churn out books.77 As to the practical implications of
Eurasianist, quasi-Eurasianist, and Imperial Nationalist
ideologies, one could point to several joint Russian/
Chinese military exercises. But this ideological layer is
increasingly influenced by others previously discussed,
who see Asia, the Muslim world in particular, as
more a threat than a help to Russia. This cautiously
pragmatic and often hostile view of Asia can be seen
in the declining popularity of Eurasianism and that
academic publications on the matter “sharply declined
after 2001.”78 And this affects the image of Iran and the
corollary discourse of Russian official and semi-official
ideologies in dealing with it.
Since approximately the middle of Putin’s tenure,
official Russian pronouncements on Iran have become
increasingly controversial and often mutually exclusive.
On one hand, officials proclaim that Iran is Russia’s
friend, one that Russia would never allow another
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state—mostly in reference to the United States—to
attack. Russian officials also make statements that
Russia is resolutely against any serious sanctions79 and
would sell Iran enough sophisticated weapons to fend
for itself.80 Russian officials also proclaimed that Russia
would either provide in the future or has already
provided sophisticated weapons to Iran’s ally, Syria,
and would close its eyes to Syria’s transfer of Russian
weapons to Iran.81 Russia seems to be unconcerned
that the sale of weapons to the major U.S. enemies in
the Middle East could seriously damage Russia-U.S.
relations.82 Moreover, Russian officials stated that
they would increase economic cooperation with Iran
and help it in many other ways.83 On the other hand,
Russian officials almost simultaneously announce that
Russia is going to support sanctions, that Russia’s sales
to Iran are quite limited,84 and that Russia is strongly
against Iran’s transformation into a nuclear power and
will do its best to prevent this.85 In any case, Iran would
not build a nuclear weapon from anything it got from
Russia.86
Moreover, while Russian official proclamations
were confusing and often flatly contradictory, its
actions were increasingly anti-Iranian. Bushehr again
is a good example. Throughout the entire Putin era,
Iran continued to buy Russian weapons. But it has
increasingly improved its own scientific/industrial
prowess and consequently the quality of its weapons.
The Russian mass media implicitly support publishing
reports about Iran’s progress in these matters. Bushehr
remains the only project where Iran completely
depends on Russian expertise.
Iranians were also aware that Russia had reaped
considerable material benefits working on Bushehr,87
and even more lucrative deals could be expected
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in the future if the project were successfully pushed
through.88 All this seems to have provided the Russia
side an opportunity to demonstrate to the Iranians
Russia’s efficiency and promptness in fulfilling its
obligation. While Russia should have finished Bushehr
a long time ago, it continued to drag its heels to the
very end of Putin’s presidency.
The reasons or excuses were many. Iranian
procrastination with paying has often had been
proclaimed as the reason for the problems.89 After
Iranian complaints and threats that they could proceed
with the construction of Bushehr without Russian help,90
Russia usually resumed the work, especially when the
Iranians insured them in regard to funding.91
Iranian nuclear ambitions were also cited as the reason for the delay.92 On occasion, Russia has informed
the Iranian side that it will withhold nuclear fuel for
Iran’s nearly completed Bushehr power plant unless
Iran suspends its uranium enrichment as demanded
by the United Nations Security Council.93 And, in
general, Russia was almost ready to stop the work.94
Yet almost simultaneously the work proceeded, and
statements were made that Russia would accomplish
its task in Bushehr regardless of any objections from
the United States or even the United Nations.95 The
Russian/Iranian relationship in regard to Bushehr
became increasingly confusing when Russia almost
simultaneously issued positive and negative signals.96
It was not surprising that the work on Bushehr
proceeded slowly. Moreover, even when Putin visited
Tehran—the first Russian leader to do so after Stalin—
he avoided making a clear promise, and he pointed to
various technical problems Russia faced in Bushehr.97
He stated with an air of sarcasm that he had made clear
promises only to his mother when he was a little boy.
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An even clearer sign of Putin’s anti-Iranian attitude
was the case with the Gabala radar station. This was
intimately related with Russia’s worries in regard to
American plans to deploy an anti-missile defense shield
in Europe. U.S. officials stated that the system should
not worry Russia. It would not tip the strategic balance
plainly because it would not defend the West from
Russian missiles. At the same time, it could intercept
a few Iranian missiles. The Russians, however, are still
worried. Their logic seems to be as follows. First, they
are fully aware that their nuclear arsenal continues
to decline and new missiles will not replace the old
ones. Second, despite possible improvements in the
penetration capabilities of the new Russian missiles,
the United States could be even more successful in
improvements of the anti-missile shield. At a certain
point, it could make a Russian retaliatory strike
impossible.
This issue certainly worries the Russian elite. Yet
Putin pretends that he believes that Iran is the sole
U.S. concern, so he proposed that the Americans use
the Gabala radar station located in Azerbaijan and
operated by Russia. Putin actually proposed letting
the Americans use the station if the missile defense
shield plans were scrapped. The fact that transfer of
U.S. surveillance to a station in Azerbaijan, close to
the Iranian border, would drastically improve U.S.
capabilities to watch Iran and help U.S. preparations
for a military strike against Iran, seems not to worry
the Russians. The Putin/Medvedev elite might even
accept a potential strike against Iran as having positive
implications for Russia, if it were the only way to halt
Iran’s transformation into a nuclear power and its
general rise, seen here as hardly benefiting Russia in
the long run.
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Yet Russia’s policy toward Israel is one of the most
indicative signs of the Russian elite’s increasing worries
about Iran and the entire Islamic world.
RUSSIA’S ISRAEL RAPPROCHEMENT AS A
SIGN OF ANTI-IRANIAN POLICY
Russia’s rapprochement with Israel is, of course, a
complicated phenomenon and cannot be seen just in
the context of the Russian-Iranian relationship. To start
with, the Russian authorities’ changes in their approach
to Israel are intimately connected with changes in
their attitude toward Russian Jews. And this has been
closely connected with the authorities’ approach to
various foreign policy issues. During the late Soviet era,
Jews were seen as a symbol of the West, with negative
implications regarding Jews and their position in the
country. Emigration confirmed the image of Jews as
actual agents of the hostile West and capitalism—the
socioeconomic and political ideological system hostile
to the USSR. In the late Soviet and especially the early
post-Soviet era, the United States and capitalism went
from completely negative to completely positive
in the authorities’ view. Consequently, Jews were
transformed from a negative to a positive symbol;
and the relationship with Israel was reestablished and
strengthened because Israel was seen as a U.S. symbol,
at a time when the United States was viewed as Russia’s
foremost geopolitical friend and ally and an example
to follow.
Putin’s rise and the exile and imprisonment of a few
tycoons (mostly Jewish, at least ethnically) created the
belief that Putin had returned to the anti-Semitic policy
of the past. This was not the case. As time progressed,
Putin made cautious friendly actions toward Jews.
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Before his formal replacement by Medvedev, he
introduced the institution of Jewish rabbi in the
Russian army. To underscore this positive approach,
Putin chose for the position an Orthodox rabbi. His
photograph, showing long, traditional attire and
beard, accompanied an interview in which he praised
the Russian military for being extremely friendly to
him; it was published in the mass media. Nothing of
this sort had been seen in the Russian army since the
1917 Revolution.
This rather positive approach to Russian Jews went
along with the more and more friendly relations with
Israel. In 2008 Russia and Israel abolished visas for
the citizens of both countries.98 This implied quite a
serious sense of mutual trust, if one would remember
that Israelis still need a visa to enter the United States.
Moreover, the Russians bought some Israeli military
equipment; and, as some Russian observers state, the
decision was not so much due to the equipment’s
superiority to Russian versions as because of political
implications.99
This positive approach to Israel and the Jews came
about for different reasons. One is the authorities’ desire
to show that Russia is part of the civilized Western
world which shuns anti-Semitism and which had been
a part of Russian life for centuries. This approach to
Israel had nothing to do with a desire to please the
United States as was the case in the beginning of the
post-Soviet era. As a matter of fact, the relationship
between Russia and the United States was rather
cool through most of Putin’s tenure. Still, the most
important was the rapprochement was mostly based
on combating a common threat, Islamic extremism;
this was where cooperation between Israel and Russia
was close.
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At the same time, the Iranians, or at least those close
to President Ahmanijhad, openly proclaimed that Israel
is the embodiment of evil. This negative image, at least
as presented to the outside world, was underscored by
Ahmanijhad’s proclamation that Iran will engage in
negotiations with any country—including the United
States—except Israel, which was absolute evil. Israel
should be completely obliterated.
It is clear that Russia’s rapprochement with Israel
should be seen as quite negative to the Iranian elite
and implicitly anti-Iranian. And it is not surprising
in this context that the negative image of Iran as a
power potentially quite dangerous for Russia has
been elaborated on by some leading Russian Jewish
intellectuals and others who share their views.
At first glance, the intellectuals seem to propose a
rather glamorous image of Iran and implicitly discard
what they regard as the naive image presented by
American mass media. Iran, in the U.S. popular
view, is a backward, almost medieval state due to its
authoritarian/totalitarian nature and the domination
of clergy over almost every aspect of life. The regime
is seen as absolutely alienated from the masses, who
crave liberty and are ready for revolution or for U.S.
liberation. These Russian intellectuals consider these
views oversimplistic and wrong.100
Some observers were especially caustic in their
criticism of U.S. pundits who believe the Iranian regime
would collapse after a few American strikes or new
sanctions.101 The Iranian regime, they implied, might
indeed resemble the USSR in the early Soviet years.
But this is not a liability but a great advantage for the
system. The totalitarian streak in the socio-economic
structure makes it possible to channel the resources of
the state to the most important projects and ensures
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rapid economic and scientific development. Iran, in this
view, has rapidly developed its economic, scientific,
and military prowess.102 According to some Russian
observers, Iran’s success is really exceptional when
compared to its neighbors.
Sergei Karaganov pointed out that Iran has made
considerable achievements since the 1979 Revolution.
“Iran has managed to limit its population growth,
establish a relatively modern educational system
as a supplement to its great ancient culture, and
achieve a small increase in per capita gross domestic
product (GDP) even before the oil boom, which was a
remarkable feat compared to the situation prevailing
in the overwhelming majority of its neighbors.“103
Iran is used to being self-sufficient over long periods
of tension with the United States, and the demand for
oil would make isolating Iran completely impossible.
Moreover, if the West demonstrated solidarity and
tried to isolate Iran by a united front, Iran would not
even need Russia, for it could always to turn to China,
the rising superpower of the 21st century, which
would never leave Iran in the cold.104 While the West’s
ability to damage the Iranian economy is limited, Iran
could damage the Western economy by disrupting oil
supplies.105
The regime also enjoys the support of a considerable
segment of the Iranian population. The masses do
not need a government that focuses its attention on
maintaining their liberty but a regime that is concerned
with the their well-being; and the Iranian regime does
precisely that. Moreover, the regime has enjoyed a
powerful messianic ideology—a blend of Shia belief in
a special role in world history with primordial Persian
nationalism—and has inculcated the masses with this
ideology.106 The Iranian elite was also able to purge Iran
from “fifth columns,” a clear difference from Iraq.107
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While enjoying a steady rise in economic, scientific,
and military standing, the Iranian regime also engaged
in sophisticated foreign policy, taking advantage of U.S.
blunders in Iraq and elsewhere. For example, Russian
observers, following Iranian pundits, believe the
American handling of Saddam Hussein was actually
quite damaging for U.S. interests in the region in the
long run.108 Finally, Iran has a web of terrorist proxies
that could create problems for the United States in Iraq
and elsewhere.109 And these views are also shared by
some Western observers.110
Russian observers believe that Iran is a rapidly
rising power, and the United States can hardly do
anything to prevent this rise, including its ultimate
transformation into a nuclear power.111 While Western
pundits regard Iran as declining and lagging behind
the advanced West, but the opposite is actually true. In
the case of a crisis of its major rival, the United States,
Iran could rapidly become not just as a regional but a
global super power. They compared Iran with Soviet
Russia, which came about as a result of World War
I and rose to a global superpower with astonishing
speed.
In this praise of Iranians’ prowess and potential,
these pundits look similar to Imperial Nationalists,
Eurasianists, and, of course, a score of Russian
Muslims. But there is a considerable difference. For
Eurasianists and Russian Imperial Nationalists, the
clear sign of Iran’s power is Russia’s invitation to join
Iran as an ally. Still, the views of the above discussed
pundits on Iran are quite different. They see Iran as a
mortal danger for Russia, related to their general fear
of the Muslim world. They noted with disapproval
Iran’s flirtation with North Korea,112 even more so
the Iranian elite call to destroy Israel.113 It is quite
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possible that the Russian elite did not much care about
Israel; but Ahmanijhad’s call for Israel’s destruction,
regardless of the consequences for the world and Iran
itself, evoked—possibly on a subconscious level—the
image of Russian Islamic extremists ready to engage
in suicidal terrorism. These signs of similarity of the
Iranian elite with Islamists was disturbing, even to
Dugin. Despite his continuous general pro-Iranian
position,114 Dugin admitted with regret that the Iranian
leader’s statement in regard to Israel was regrettable,
as was Iran’s flirtation with Islamists.115
For Dugin and his supporters, the problems in
the Russian/Iranian relationship are due to Iranian
behavior, or at least this played a clear role in
complicating the Russian/Iranian relationship; other
supporters of a Russia-Iran axis see problems basically
on Russia’s side. Ivashov, for example, continued to
regard the alliance between Russia, Iran, and other
Asian countries as the only way for salvation.116
Ivashov’s views here were quite similar to those at
the beginning of Putin’s ascendance to power. He
continued to maintain a good personal relationship
with the members of the Iranian elite and was trusted
enough to be invited to Iranian military maneuvers.
Later, on his return, he stated in an interview that
he was amazed by the sophistication of the Iranian
armed forces and the quality of Iranian weapons. But
he believed that despite the achievements of Iranian
science and industry, Iran might acquire additional
Russian weapons and that Russia could well take
advantage of present anti-American feelings and sell
more weapons all over the world.117
Ivashov was, however, apparently skeptical of
any prospects for real Russian/Iranian cooperation,
and this was directly connected with his vision of
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Putin’s regime and Russia’s future in general. Soon
after Putin’s rise, Ivashov was pensioned off, clearly
not at his personal desire. He found out soon that
Putin’s socio-economic policy was not much different
from Yeltsin’s, and this inculcated Ivashov with the
gloomy thought that Russia’s decline would continue.
Moreover, Russia quite possibly had entered the last
period of its existence as a state. This sort of gloomy
view of Russia’s present and future was incorporated
in Ivashov’s view of the Iranian relationship. He clearly
approved of Russia’s support of Iran; but he did not
believe that Russia would be a true ally of Iran. He
regarded Russia’s position as that of a loose, immoral
girl who tried to please several suitors to get gifts from
all of them.118
GEORGIAN WAR
Russia’s war with Georgia led to a sharp increase in
tensions between Russia and the United States. At that
time, Russia seemed to have returned to its 1999-2001
approach to Iran. Authors of several articles implied
that in facing the hostile West, Russia once again
should turn to Iran, providing it with sophisticated
weapons and even helping in the development of its
nuclear capabilities. In this approach to the country,
Iran emerged in the way as had been visualized by
Eurasianists and Russian Imperial Nationalists. It was
seen as a mighty state whose culture was quite close
to that of Russia. And the implications were that Iran
and Russia could, indeed, forge an alliance of a sort;
and the very fact that Iran was among the few nations
that supported Russia in the war seems to have made
this alliance even more likely.119 Still, this brief splash
of confidence and elaboration on Eurasian/Russian
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Imperial ideology was quite short. An increasing sense
of instability led to the emergence of new trends in
approaching Iran, which still emphasize the concern
and uncertainty in regard to the future of Russian/
Iranian relations.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
As was noted, the Russian elites’ approach to
Iran was incorporated in their general vision of the
world around them. This vision of the Muslim world
was especially important. From the late Soviet era
to approximately 1999-2000, the view that the West,
especially the United States, is hardly Russia’s friend
steadily increased in popularity, along with the belief
that Russia should turn to the East for true allies. In
the late Soviet/early post-Soviet era, this view was
rather marginal, popular mostly among those in
opposition to Yeltsin. Still, as time progressed, the idea
began to percolate to semi-official and finally official
circles. It was at this point that Iran reemerged as a key
geopolitical player and one of the most important of
Russia’s allies.
On the other hand, the increasing problems with
Islamic fundamentalists cast a negative light on Iran, in
spite of Iran’s assertion that it had nothing to do with
Islamic extremists and was their sworn enemy. Recent
geopolitical and economic trends have led to a new
perception of the Muslim threat and the place of Iran
in the context of this threat. Through most of the late
Putin era, the Muslim threat—at least as far as Iran was
concerned—had an important dimension. It was the
threat of an emerging strong, possibly nuclear power on
Russia’s southern borders, whose characteristics could
well be similar to those of the USSR at the beginning of
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the Soviet era. At the same time, the Russian elite had,
in general, a feeling that the present-day Russia could
hardly be an ally of this state. Moreover, Russia could
well be a victim of the rising Iran, which represented the
power of Asia, e.g., China—and could create a problem
for Russia, regardless of any conflict with the United
States. Barack Obama’s election to the U.S. presidency
has in a way heightened these apprehensions; and
the Russian elites’ view of Obama’s approach to the
Muslim world is controversial enough.
On one hand, the Russian elite is apparently
worried that the Obama administration could make
a drastic shift in American foreign policy. The Bush
administration was perceived as anti-Islamic; Obama
might proclaim the United States the best friend of
Muslims. The anxiety is heightened by the assertion of
Russian Nationalists, from moderates to rabid racists,
that Obama’s election signals the end of an era in
global and, definitely, American history. In the past,
the United States was basically a country of white
people, all influence of minorities notwithstanding.
Its dominance as a global power indicated the global
dominant position of the white man.
According to these observers, this arrangement is
over: in Obama’s America, non-whites have become the
dominant force. Logically, non-white America could
join Iran—perceived here as a non-white country. Any
alliance between the United States and Iran, in fact, the
entire non-Western world, would be directed against
Russia, which is still seen as the stronghold of white
Christian civilization. This sense of a possible alliance
between the United States and Iran and, in fact, the
entire Muslim world, at the expense of others, Russia,
for example, is deeply rooted in the fears described
above. Indeed, many Russian Nationalists, such as

68

Eurasianists and Russian Imperial Nationalists, see the
terrorist attacks by Chechens in the 1990s and early
2000s as directly inspired by the United States. The rise
of Iran in tandem with the United States bothers the
Russian elite and urges caution in regard to Iran.
Another trend in the minds of the Russian elite
implies a rather positive view of Iran that might be
compared with the views of the Eurasianists and
Imperial Russian Nationalists. But this positive image
is quite different in essence from that entertained by
those groups. The Imperial Nationalists praised Iran
for its anti-American position and defiant radicalism.
A segment of the present Russian elite sees Iran as a
moderate force allied against Muslim radicals and
would be pleased by an American rapprochement with
Iran. This vision of Iran as a moderate and, in a way,
stabilizing force is deeply connected with the sense of
instability the Russian elite started to experience at the
beginning of the present global economic crisis.
Since the beginning of Putin’s presidency, the
Russian economy had been on the rise, manifested
among many other things in appreciation of the rubles
value. For example, in the last 5 or 6 years, the value
of the Russian ruble vis-à-vis that of the American
dollar rises considerably. This was a potent symbol
for Russians, who believed that while the dollar is
increasingly in trouble, the Russian economy is rising.
The sense of not just economic but geopolitical might
had been reached during the Russian-Georgian War.
For the first time in post-Soviet history, Russia was
successful in a war, and since Georgia was seen as the
U.S. proxy, it was assumed that Russia had defeated
not just Georgia, but the mighty United States.
The economic crisis did not affect Russia
immediately. Oil prices continued to rise for a while;
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and this created the impression among a considerable
number of both the elite and populace that demand for
Russian oil and gas would continue, despite America’s
troubles, because of the expanding Asian economy.
The sharp drop in oil prices and the decline of the ruble
was a shock for them. The currency reserve started to
shrink, and the declining economy might lead to a
sharp increase in unemployment for the first time in
the post-Soviet era. During Yeltsin’s tenure, workers
were not paid, but they were not formally laid off and
could believe they would finally be paid. It is only now
that real unemployment has become a problem.
The Russian authorities face different situations from
those of the Yeltsin period from another perspective as
well. During the entire Yeltsin period, mass violence
was practically nonexistent, even during the events of
fall 1993 when only a handful of people defended the
Russian parliament building against Yeltsin’s troops.
Most Muscovites either paid no attention to the events
or watched it as a sort of macabre theatrical show. This
was, at least, partly because those who were against the
regime were mostly elderly or middle-aged people. The
youth—the most active part of the population—were in
general on the side of the regime. The situation today
is quite different. Increasing numbers of Russian youth
are deeply disenchanted with the regime and ready for
violence. Several major riots erupted in Russia in 2006
and 2007. Hundreds of people were involved, and riot
police were employed.
The fear of instability is also projected to the
Muslim world. Russia became quite concerned with
developments in Afghanistan and the clear signs, at least
from the Russian officers’ points of view, that coalition
forces would fail to suppress the Taliban. The Russian
elite increasingly worried that a Taliban victory would
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spill over to Central Asia and the Caucasus. In this case,
their major interest is not so much a drive for imperial
aggrandizement—not consistent or strong even at the
beginning of Putin’s presidency—but stability and the
oil/gas turf in Central Asia. This explains America’s
problems with keeping a base in Manas, Kyrgyzstan;
from this perspective, most of the Russian elite is in
favor of approaching Iran.
As was noted above, Iran appealed to Eurasianists
and Imperial Russian Nationalists because they saw in
it a mighty, radical state that was uncompromisingly
anti-American. This new approach to appreciation of
Iran is based on different principles: Iran as a force
of stability and moderation. It has been asserted that
Afghanistan cannot be stabilized without Iran.
CONCLUSION
The image of Iran has been incorporated into the
Russian elite’s vision of the Muslim world. The positive
image of Iran was mostly included in a few ideological
paradigms; for ethnic Russians, who should still be
seen as the dominant force in the Russian Federation,
Eurasianism that should be seen here as the most
important.
The proponents of Eurasianism regard unity/
alliance between ethnic Russians and Muslim peoples
of the Russian Federation as the very essence of Russian
civilization. In the late Soviet/early post-Soviet Russia,
Eurasianists focused on the relationship between
ethnic Russians and Muslims within the USSR and
former USSR. Later, their interests became increasingly
global, and Iran emerged as the most important
potential Russian ally, not just as a counterbalance to
the United States and the West in general, but as a way
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to make Russia once again a great power. In the early
years of its existence, members of this group were
strongly anti-American. Still, their views were marginal
in the beginning of the post-Soviet era. However,
with increasing disenchantment with post-Soviet
arrangements and the steady evolution of the Yeltsin
regime along authoritarian lines, pro-Iranian views
became increasingly popular, even around general
pro-western segments of the population, and by the
beginning of Putin’s tenure seem to have become the
essential foreign policy element in restoring Russia’s
imperial might and prestige.
Yet, even at the height of their popularity at
the beginning of Putin’s tenure, these imperial and
implicitly pro-Iranian views were not consistent,
and the translation of even the strongest pro-Iranian
statements into real action was quite limited. And,
as time progressed, these views became increasingly
challenged. There were many reasons for this. One
was certainly the very composition of the Russian elite,
who were mostly Western-oriented by lifestyle and
economic interests and would hardly engage in actions
that could endanger them. But there was another
reason, the most important for our monograph.
The vision of Iran as the most important Russian
ally implies a good relationship with the Muslim
community, especially inside the Russian Federation.
By approximately the middle of Putin’s presidency,
there were growing signs of tension, increased by the
smoldering conflict in the Caucasus. As a result of this,
the elite’s approach to Iran became more irrational
and controversial. Furthermore, the image of Iran
as a potentially dangerous power was increasingly
disseminated by the end of the Putin presidency. A
positive image of Israel, a sworn enemy of Iran, and
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growing Russian/Israeli contacts were some of the
salient manifestations of this trend. This flirtation with
Israel also related to ambivalent feelings toward the
Islamic world and a general sense of insecurity, which
increased as the result of an economic crisis and the rise
of the Taliban. In this case, Iran emerged not so much
as a mighty empire with which Russia could challenge
the United States but as a more moderate state, at
least in comparison to Muslim extremism. Taking a
20-25 year trend in toto, one can see the peak of the
idea of ethnic Russians, Russian Muslims, and Iranian
rapprochement standing together against the United
States in 1999-2001, with a steady subsequent decline
regardless of all the zigzags on the way. A reversal of
this trend seems unlikely.
Another related finding is the multilayer nature of
the ideological array. The evolution of a new outlook
does not lead to the removal of old ideological layers.
The old ones are not doomed to complete extinction
and could exist with the new one, which could create
the impression of a contradictory ideological picture
and complicate identifying a dominant trend. Yet this
trend exists and can be defined.
What are the practical implications of these trends,
in particular the Russian/Iranian relationship, for U.S.
foreign policy? Such questions should be placed in the
context of more general questions in regard to Russia’s
general foreign policy posture. With increasing oil
prices and general stability of the regime—at least
in comparison to that of the Yeltsin era—increasing
numbers of Western pundits assert that Russia is in
the process of resuming the long history of imperial
build-up. The Georgia war seems to have supported
this assumption. The recent Russian attempt to create
problems for the United States in Central Asia seems
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to provide additional arguments for Russia’s imperial
aspirations. But this assumption should be taken with
a grain of salt.
Russia’s instability and cool relationship with the
Muslim world both inside and outside the former
USSR—the relationship with moderate and usually
pro-American regimes such as the Gulf states and
the Saudis is the only exception—parallels Russia’s
continuing strained relationship with the West. Russia
found little rapprochement in the past with the United
States, despite Putin’s good personal relationship
with Bush, nor with West/Central Europe, despite the
Russian elite’s close economic and personal ties with
this part of the world.
At the same time, Russia continues to be deeply
alienated and often openly hostile to Eastern Europe.
Russia’s position inside the former USSR is also
unstable, and the war with Georgia did not help
Russia’s influence in this part of the world. Russia
was not able to intimidate the former Soviet republics
enough to compel them to submit to Russia’s will. It is
also unlikely that it could be rich enough to buy their
good will, as it did with Kyrgyzstan, and even here
Russia was not successful; indeed Makas continued
to be used by the United States. Furthermore, the war
practically destroyed the last remnant of good will and
memories about Russia as a core of the common state to
which all of the republics belonged in the not so distant
past. The war was not supported by anyone, and led
to a sharp deterioration in Russia’s relationship with
some of its neighbors, such as Ukraine.
In general, the cool relationship between Russia and
other former republics of the USSR does not exclude
occasional cooperation, for example, the creation of a
joint military force to fend off a possible threat from the
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Taliban. Such a relationship is quite pragmatic and, by
its very nature, fleeting. With not many friends either
in the West or in the East, including the Muslim world,
Russia, more than at any other time in its modern
history, is increasingly inward-looking and isolated.
The major preoccupation of the present Russian elite is
not building influence or direct expansion, but a search
for stability, regardless of assertive rhetoric.
Stability has become even more important in the
current economic crisis, which has affected Russia’s
perception of Iran. While the proponents of the Eurasian
paradigm saw Russia and Iran as friendly powers who
were ready to support each other even at the risk of
major war, the current Russian elite approach is quite
different. They court Iran for pragmatic and often
fleeting commercial interests. Russia’s flirtation with
Iran could also be intended to send signals to the United
States that Russia is displeased with certain American
actions—condemnation of Russia’s war with Georgia
or plans to install American missiles in East Europe.
The same pragmatism could well be the case with the
Iranians, who, one might surmise, would hardly take
Russian interests much to heart in planning their own
geopolitical posture.
Russia has been against the United States striking
against Iran, though even here it has not always been
consistent. The major concern for Russia was not so
much the increased American imperial presence in
the Middle East as that the war could lead to a sharp
rise of instability that would finally be transmitted to
Russia’s backyard. Consequently, easing an Iranian/
U.S. standoff would be approached positively, even
with tongue in cheek. Russia might be suspicious that
an U.S./Iran alliance could occur at Russia’s expense.
But easing the tension would be much appreciated if
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Russia were seen as a part of the solution, and Russia’s
interests, such as a monopoly on supplying gas to
Europe, would not suffer. Russia would also be pleased
with a U.S. rapprochement with Iran in connection with
Afghanistan. Here, Russia sees Iran as a positive force
because it is a moderate state, at least in comparison
to the Taliban—a force that could help in dealing with
the Afghanistan quagmire. At the same time, U.S.
cooperation with both Russia and Iran could be in the
U.S. best interests. Indeed, contending with global
chaos in which terrorists and crime flourish might be
one of the most important problems with which the
United States will need to deal in the future.
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